Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-101086 Overview
CVE-2026-101086 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in Nezha Dashboard versions before 2.3.5. The flaw stems from missing validation of task types submitted through the service monitor API. Authenticated users holding the nezha:service:write scope can submit privileged task types that the API should reject. The service monitor and privileged operations share a common protobuf Task.Type namespace, which the application fails to constrain to probe-only tasks. Attackers can deliver command execution or Agent configuration tasks to any Agent within their authorization scope. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management.
Critical Impact
Authenticated users can execute arbitrary commands on monitored Agents by abusing the service monitor endpoint to deliver privileged task types.
Affected Products
- Nezha Dashboard versions prior to 2.3.5
- Nezha Agents reachable from a vulnerable Dashboard
- Deployments exposing the service monitor API to authenticated users
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-27 - CVE CVE-2026-101086 published to NVD
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-101086
Vulnerability Analysis
Nezha Dashboard exposes a service monitor API for defining probe tasks that Agents execute to check endpoint availability. The dashboard represents these tasks using a protobuf Task.Type enumeration shared across both monitor probes and privileged operations such as command execution and Agent configuration. The service monitor handler accepts any Type value the client submits and dispatches it to Agents in the authorized scope. Because the handler never confirms that the submitted type is a probe type, an authenticated user with the nezha:service:write scope can craft a request specifying a privileged task type. The Agent then executes the delivered task as if it were an operator-issued command. This grants the attacker command execution on remote Agents without ever holding operator-level privileges.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing input validation at the service monitor API boundary. The handler in cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go binds the request JSON into a monitor form and dispatches it without constraining mf.Type to the probe subset of the shared enum.
Attack Vector
An authenticated attacker with the nezha:service:write scope submits a POST request to the service monitor endpoint. The payload includes a Type field set to a privileged task type instead of a probe type. The Dashboard forwards the task to Agents within the attacker's authorization scope, where it executes.
// Patch excerpt: cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&mf); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := model.ValidateServiceMonitorType(uint64(mf.Type)); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if !isValidServiceCover(mf.Cover) {
return 0, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied")
}
Source: nezhahq/nezha commit 38824dbc
The patch inserts a ValidateServiceMonitorType check that rejects any task type outside the supported probe set before further processing.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-101086
Indicators of Compromise
- Service monitor API requests containing Type values that fall outside the documented probe enumeration range.
- Agent logs showing command execution or configuration change tasks that did not originate from an operator action.
- Unexpected outbound processes spawned by the Nezha Agent shortly after a service monitor create or update call.
Detection Strategies
- Audit HTTP access logs for POST requests to the service monitor endpoints that correlate with Agent-side process creation events.
- Inspect Nezha Dashboard audit logs for nezha:service:write activity performed by non-operator accounts.
- Correlate Agent telemetry with Dashboard API activity to flag command tasks delivered through the service pathway.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on any Nezha Agent process spawning a shell interpreter or writing to Agent configuration files.
- Monitor authentication events for accounts granted the nezha:service:write scope and review their recent API calls.
- Track version strings reported by Dashboard instances and flag any still running releases prior to 2.3.5.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101086
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all Nezha Dashboard deployments to version 2.3.5 or later.
- Review and reduce accounts holding the nezha:service:write scope to the minimum necessary.
- Rotate API tokens that may have been exposed to non-trusted users prior to the upgrade.
Patch Information
The fix is published in the upstream commit 38824dbc11a63964c5b9296ae4c68e62b34fa04b and documented in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-grrw-fx36-fv32. Additional analysis is available in the VulnCheck Advisory for Nezha Dashboard. The patch adds model.ValidateServiceMonitorType to constrain submitted task types to supported probes.
Workarounds
- Restrict the Dashboard API to trusted operators only until the upgrade is deployed.
- Place the Dashboard behind an authenticating reverse proxy that filters out unexpected Type values in service monitor requests.
- Revoke the nezha:service:write scope from any account that does not require it.
# Verify running Nezha Dashboard version and upgrade
docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' nezha-dashboard
docker pull ghcr.io/nezhahq/nezha-dashboard:v2.3.5
docker stop nezha-dashboard && docker rm nezha-dashboard
# Redeploy using your existing compose or run configuration pinned to v2.3.5
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

