Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-101058 Overview
CVE-2026-101058 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in python-utcp, the Python implementation of the Universal Tool Calling Protocol distributed as the utcp-http pip package. Versions before 1.1.12 fail to verify that tool URLs declared in a hand-written UTCP manual belong to the agent's loopback interface when the manual itself is fetched from a remote origin. An attacker who hosts a crafted manual can trick a victim client into issuing requests to services bound to 127.0.0.1 and relay the responses back. The http, sse, and streamable_http protocols are all affected.
Critical Impact
An attacker-controlled UTCP manual can coerce a victim's agent into reading data from loopback-only services and returning the responses to the attacker.
Affected Products
- python-utcp (pip package utcp-http) versions prior to 1.1.12
- UTCP clients using the http protocol handler
- UTCP clients using the sse and streamable_http protocol handlers
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-27 - CVE-2026-101058 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-101058
Vulnerability Analysis
UTCP manuals describe tools and the URLs clients should call to invoke them. The ensure_secure_url helper intentionally allows loopback HTTP so developers can register tools served from localhost during local development. The OpenAPI converter enforces an additional check that rejects loopback tool URLs when the manual itself originated from a non-loopback host. Native, hand-written manuals bypass this converter path and inherit only the permissive ensure_secure_url behavior.
The result is an origin-mismatch SSRF. A manual retrieved from an attacker-controlled remote server can declare tool endpoints that point at http://127.0.0.1:<port>/..., and the UTCP client will dispatch requests to those endpoints on the victim host. Response bodies are returned to the calling agent and, through it, back to the attacker. Reach is bounded by what the loopback interface exposes.
Root Cause
The root cause is inconsistent trust-boundary enforcement between the OpenAPI manual parser and the native manual parser. Only the OpenAPI path correlates the manual's discovery origin with the tool URLs it declares. The native path trusts whatever URLs the manual contains, allowing a remote-origin manual to reference loopback resources without rejection.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires that a victim registers a UTCP manual served from an attacker-controlled, non-loopback origin. The manual declares one or more tools whose URLs resolve to the victim's loopback interface. When the agent invokes those tools, the client issues HTTP, SSE, or streaming HTTP requests to the local services and returns their response bodies to the caller. Practical impact depends on a loopback service answering unauthenticated requests with useful data such as metadata APIs, admin consoles, or developer-only endpoints.
// No verified exploit code is published for CVE-2026-101058.
// See the GitHub Security Advisory and VulnCheck advisory listed under References for technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-101058
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP requests from a developer or agent host to a remote origin that returns a UTCP manual referencing 127.0.0.1, localhost, or ::1 tool URLs.
- Unexpected loopback HTTP, SSE, or streamable-HTTP traffic from the utcp-http client process immediately after a manual registration event.
- Access log entries on loopback-bound services showing requests originating from the local UTCP client without a corresponding user action.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory Python environments for utcp-http versions earlier than 1.1.12 using pip list or SBOM tooling.
- Inspect application logs for UTCP manual registration events whose discovery URL is non-loopback but whose declared tool URLs resolve to loopback addresses.
- Correlate process telemetry: flag cases where the UTCP client process initiates loopback TCP connections shortly after fetching a manual from an external host.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor egress and loopback traffic from hosts running UTCP agents, alerting on new loopback destinations invoked by the client.
- Track changes to UTCP manual sources and maintain an allowlist of trusted manual origins.
- Audit local services bound to 127.0.0.1 for unauthenticated endpoints that would be attractive SSRF targets.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101058
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade utcp-http to version 1.1.12 or later on all hosts running UTCP clients or agents.
- Review all currently registered UTCP manuals and remove any whose source origin is untrusted or whose declared tool URLs point at loopback.
- Restrict which users and automated workflows can register new UTCP manuals.
Patch Information
The issue is fixed in utcp-http 1.1.12. The patch rejects manuals fetched from a non-loopback origin that declare loopback tool URLs, using the final post-redirect discovery URL as the trust anchor. Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8vxx-v7r9-948g and the VulnCheck Advisory for Python UTCP for the full technical write-up.
Workarounds
- Only register UTCP manuals served from loopback or from explicitly trusted internal origins until the upgrade is applied.
- Require authentication on any HTTP service bound to 127.0.0.1, including developer tools and metadata endpoints, so that unauthenticated SSRF yields no useful data.
- Run UTCP agents in network namespaces or containers that do not share the loopback interface with sensitive local services.
# Upgrade the vulnerable package
pip install --upgrade 'utcp-http>=1.1.12'
# Verify the installed version
pip show utcp-http | grep -i version
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

