Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100891 Overview
CVE-2026-100891 is an encoding error in Trusted Domain Project OpenDMARC up to version 1.4.2. The flaw resides in the opendmarc_policy_query_dmarc function within libopendmarc/opendmarc_policy.c, which handles Internationalized Domain Names (IDN). Improper handling of U-label to A-label conversion [CWE-172] causes DMARC policy queries to be performed against unconverted Unicode domain strings. An attacker can trigger the condition remotely through crafted email traffic. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and the vendor did not respond to pre-disclosure outreach.
Critical Impact
Mail receivers running OpenDMARC may incorrectly evaluate DMARC policy for internationalized domains, undermining email authentication decisions for inbound mail.
Affected Products
- Trusted Domain Project OpenDMARC through 1.4.2
- Mail transfer agents integrating libopendmarc
- Email gateways relying on OpenDMARC policy evaluation
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-100891 published to NVD
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100891
Vulnerability Analysis
OpenDMARC evaluates DMARC policy by resolving TXT records associated with the sender's domain. When an Internationalized Domain Name is submitted, the library must first convert the Unicode U-label representation into its ASCII-Compatible Encoding (ACE) A-label form, typically prefixed with xn--, before performing the DNS query.
In versions through 1.4.2, opendmarc_policy_query_dmarc in libopendmarc/opendmarc_policy.c does not perform the required U-label to A-label conversion. The function issues DNS queries using the raw Unicode bytes supplied by the caller. The lookup therefore fails or returns an unintended result, and policy evaluation diverges from the state expected by the DMARC specification.
The weakness is classified as improper handling of encoded data [CWE-172]. The attack vector is network-based, requires no authentication, and no user interaction. Impact is limited to the integrity and availability of DMARC policy decisions, not direct code execution. EPSS places exploitation likelihood at 0.293% (19.7 percentile).
Root Cause
The root cause is the absence of Punycode conversion for the input domain prior to DNS resolution. The function trusts the raw domain string and does not normalize internationalized labels into ASCII form as required by RFC 5891.
Attack Vector
A remote attacker sends email from a domain containing non-ASCII labels. When the receiving mail server passes the sender domain to OpenDMARC, the library queries a non-existent or incorrect DNS name. The result is a DMARC evaluation that may bypass expected enforcement for internationalized sender domains. See the Weitongli OpenDMARC Analysis for the technical write-up.
// No verified exploit code is published. Behavior is described in prose.
// See the referenced analysis for reproduction details.
Stop Remote Code Execution Before It Runs
Singularity™ Endpoint detects and blocks exploit attempts at machine speed, including zero-days and novel attack techniques.
Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2026-100891
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound mail from IDN sender domains receiving DMARC none results where enforcement was expected.
- OpenDMARC log entries showing DNS queries containing raw UTF-8 bytes rather than xn-- prefixed labels.
- Spikes in SERVFAIL or NXDOMAIN responses for DMARC TXT lookups tied to internationalized domains.
Detection Strategies
- Audit MTA logs for DMARC evaluation outcomes correlated with IDN sender domains and compare against expected policy.
- Deploy test messages from controlled IDN domains and verify that OpenDMARC resolves the A-label form before reaching production.
- Enable packet or query-level DNS logging on mail relays to confirm Punycode normalization occurs upstream of libopendmarc.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward MTA and DMARC verifier logs to a centralized analytics platform and alert on policy regressions for IDN domains.
- Track the ratio of DMARC pass, fail, and none results broken down by domain encoding type.
- Monitor DNS resolver telemetry for malformed query names originating from mail infrastructure.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100891
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all mail systems that link against libopendmarc version 1.4.2 or earlier.
- Preprocess inbound sender domains through a Punycode converter before invoking OpenDMARC policy functions.
- Elevate DMARC enforcement review for mail flows that include internationalized sender domains.
Patch Information
No vendor patch is referenced in the published advisory. The vendor was contacted prior to disclosure and did not respond. Operators should track the OpenDMARC project repository for a fixed release addressing U-label conversion in opendmarc_policy_query_dmarc.
Workarounds
- Normalize sender domains to A-label form within the MTA before passing them to OpenDMARC.
- Apply a local source patch that invokes an IDN conversion routine such as idn2_lookup_u8 prior to the DNS query.
- Supplement OpenDMARC with a secondary DMARC verifier that correctly handles IDN inputs for defense in depth.
# Example: convert a U-label domain to A-label with idn2 before policy query
echo 'münchen.example' | idn2
# Expected output: xn--mnchen-3ya.example
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

