Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-100553

CVE-2026-100553: OpenClaw Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-100553 is an authentication bypass flaw in OpenClaw that allows authenticated users to remove pins from Feishu groups bypassing cross-context policies. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-100553 Overview

CVE-2026-100553 is an authorization flaw [CWE-863] in OpenClaw affecting versions >= 2026.6.9 and < 2026.8.1. The Feishu unpin feature fails to declare the native chatId parameter as a delivery target. As a result, unpin requests bypass the shared same-provider cross-context target check. When tools.message.crossContext.allowWithinProvider is disabled, an authenticated sender can remove a pin from another Feishu group that both the sender and the configured account can access. Feishu membership and group authorization still enforce access, so the demonstrated impact is limited to message mutation through pin removal.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can bypass the cross-context message mutation policy and remove pins from Feishu groups outside the intended delivery scope.

Affected Products

  • OpenClaw >= 2026.6.9
  • OpenClaw < 2026.8.1
  • Feishu integration module (unpin feature)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-26 - CVE-2026-100553 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-100553

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in OpenClaw's handling of Feishu unpin requests. OpenClaw enforces a cross-context policy to prevent an authenticated sender from mutating messages in chats outside the configured delivery scope. The policy inspects declared delivery targets to decide whether the request stays within the same provider boundary. The Feishu unpin handler does not declare the native chatId parameter as a delivery target. The policy engine therefore does not evaluate the target chat identifier when applying the shared same-provider cross-context check. When tools.message.crossContext.allowWithinProvider is set to disabled, the check should block the request, but the missing declaration causes a bypass. The result is a broken authorization condition rather than a privilege escalation, since Feishu's own membership and group authorization still gate access to the target group.

Root Cause

The root cause is an incomplete authorization specification in the Feishu unpin tool definition. Because chatId is not registered as a delivery target, the cross-context policy evaluator skips the check that would reject unpin requests addressed to a different group. This matches the classic pattern of CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization, where a security decision is made against incomplete input.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an authenticated OpenClaw user whose configured Feishu account has access to more than one group. The attacker issues an unpin request that targets a chatId other than the one scoped by the current conversation context. The missing target declaration causes the cross-context guard to permit the call. Feishu then processes the unpin because the configured account retains membership in the target group. See the GitHub Security Advisory and the VulnCheck Advisory on OpenClaw for additional technical details.

Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails

Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.

Stop Identity Attacks

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100553

Indicators of Compromise

  • Feishu audit log entries showing pin removal events originating from the OpenClaw service account in groups outside the user's expected context.
  • OpenClaw request logs containing Feishu unpin tool invocations with a chatId value that does not match the active conversation context.
  • Repeated unpin operations across multiple distinct chatId values within a short window from the same authenticated sender.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate OpenClaw tool-invocation logs with Feishu administrative events to identify unpin actions where the target chatId was never declared as a delivery target.
  • Alert on invocations of the Feishu unpin tool when tools.message.crossContext.allowWithinProvider is configured as disabled in the deployment.
  • Baseline normal unpin volume per user and flag deviations that may indicate automated policy-bypass abuse.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on OpenClaw's Feishu provider to capture every unpin request with sender identity, source context, and target chatId.
  • Forward OpenClaw and Feishu audit logs to a centralized SIEM or data lake for cross-source correlation.
  • Review authorization policy configuration drift, specifically the state of tools.message.crossContext.allowWithinProvider, on a scheduled cadence.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100553

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.8.1 or later, which declares chatId as a delivery target and restores the cross-context check.
  • Audit recent Feishu unpin activity initiated through OpenClaw to identify any policy-bypass events.
  • Review the configured Feishu account's group memberships and remove access to groups outside the intended operational scope.

Patch Information

The issue is fixed in OpenClaw version 2026.8.1. The fix adds the native chatId parameter to the Feishu unpin feature's declared delivery targets so the shared same-provider cross-context target check evaluates the request correctly. Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-h9jh-75j7-7hhx for the authoritative patch reference.

Workarounds

  • Restrict the configured Feishu account's membership to only the groups required for OpenClaw operation, reducing the set of chats reachable by an unpin bypass.
  • Disable the Feishu unpin tool in OpenClaw's tool configuration until the upgrade to 2026.8.1 is deployed.
  • Monitor Feishu audit logs for unexpected pin-removal events and manually re-pin affected messages as needed.
bash
# Configuration example
# Upgrade OpenClaw to the patched release
pip install --upgrade "openclaw>=2026.8.1"

# Verify installed version
python -c "import openclaw; print(openclaw.__version__)"

# Enforce cross-context policy in OpenClaw configuration
# tools:
#   message:
#     crossContext:
#       allowWithinProvider: false

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.