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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-100502

CVE-2026-100502: Flame Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-100502 is an authentication bypass flaw in Flame through version 2.4.0 that allows attackers to create permanent admin tokens. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-100502 Overview

CVE-2026-100502 is an insufficient session expiration vulnerability [CWE-613] in Flame versions through 2.4.0, an open-source self-hosted startpage and application dashboard. The login endpoint accepts an unvalidated duration parameter, allowing a caller with former administrator credentials to mint JavaScript Web Tokens (JWTs) with arbitrary lifespans. Because Flame verifies tokens only against a static JWT secret that is never rotated, the resulting tokens survive password changes and continue to grant full dashboard control. The flaw was documented in the VulnCheck Security Advisory and tracked in GitHub Issue #494.

Critical Impact

An attacker who previously held administrator access can retain near-permanent control of the Flame dashboard, bypassing credential rotation as a containment measure.

Affected Products

  • Flame dashboard versions through 2.4.0
  • Self-hosted deployments of the pawelmalak/flame application
  • Any instance relying on the default static JWT secret generated at initialization

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-25 - CVE-2026-100502 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-100502

Vulnerability Analysis

Flame authenticates administrators through a login controller that returns a signed JWT upon successful password validation. The controller accepts a client-supplied duration parameter and passes it directly to the token signing routine without range checking or server-side policy enforcement. An authenticated caller can therefore request a token lifespan measured in years rather than the intended short-lived session window.

Token validation on subsequent requests depends solely on the JWT signature verifying against a secret established at first run. The secret is generated once by the initialization routine and persisted on disk, with no mechanism to rotate it when credentials change or when a session is believed to be compromised. The combination of client-controlled expiration and a non-rotatable signing key removes the normal containment benefit of a password reset.

See the GitHub Login Controller Code, the GitHub Token Signing Code, and the GitHub Initialization Secret Code for the exact implementation paths.

Root Cause

The root cause maps to [CWE-613] Insufficient Session Expiration. The login handler trusts a client-supplied duration value and the signing utility applies it verbatim. No independent server-side maximum lifetime exists, and the signing secret is treated as a one-time initialization artifact rather than a rotatable credential.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires a prior administrator authentication. The attacker submits a login request containing an inflated duration parameter and receives a long-lived JWT. The attacker then stores the token outside the application. If a defender later changes the administrator password or disables the account, the attacker continues to authenticate using the previously issued token because the JWT secret remains unchanged.

No verified public exploit code is published for this issue. Readers requiring deeper implementation detail should consult the referenced source files in the GitHub Repository for Flame.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100502

Indicators of Compromise

  • Successful POST requests to the Flame /api/auth login endpoint containing non-standard or unusually large duration values in the request body.
  • Authenticated API calls accompanied by JWTs whose exp claim is weeks, months, or years in the future.
  • Administrator actions originating from source IP addresses that have not performed a recent interactive login.

Detection Strategies

  • Decode JWTs observed in reverse proxy or web server logs and flag any token whose iat to exp delta exceeds the organization's maximum session policy.
  • Correlate password change events with subsequent successful authenticated API activity that was not preceded by a fresh login.
  • Baseline login request bodies and alert on structural deviations such as the presence of unexpected duration fields.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose request logging on the Flame reverse proxy and ship logs to a centralized analytics platform for retention and query.
  • Monitor file integrity on the data/ directory where the JWT secret is persisted, so unauthorized reads can be investigated.
  • Alert on repeated authenticated access from previously unseen user agents or geographies following any administrator credential change.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100502

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the Flame dashboard to trusted management networks or place it behind an authenticating reverse proxy.
  • Rotate the JWT signing secret stored on disk and restart the Flame service so all previously issued tokens are invalidated.
  • Audit the list of individuals who have ever held administrator credentials and assume any prior token may still be valid.

Patch Information

No fixed version is referenced in the NVD entry at publication time. Monitor the GitHub Repository for Flame and GitHub Issue #494 for upstream remediation. The VulnCheck Security Advisory tracks disclosure status.

Workarounds

  • Replace the initialization-generated JWT secret with a strong value and automate periodic rotation outside the application lifecycle.
  • Terminate the Flame container or process and redeploy with a new secret whenever an administrator password is changed.
  • Front the application with a reverse proxy that enforces its own authentication and a hard session timeout independent of the Flame-issued JWT.
bash
# Configuration example: rotate the Flame JWT secret and restart the service
rm /app/data/secret
docker restart flame

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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