CVE-2025-8098: Lenovo PC Manager Privilege Escalation Flaw

CVE-2025-8098 Overview

CVE-2025-8098 is an improper permission vulnerability in Lenovo PC Manager that allows a local attacker to escalate privileges. The flaw is categorized under [CWE-276] Incorrect Default Permissions. A local, low-privileged user can leverage misconfigured access controls on Lenovo PC Manager components to gain higher-privileged execution on the affected Windows host. Lenovo published a security advisory addressing the issue, and the vulnerability carries a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.5.

Critical Impact
A successful exploit grants an attacker high impact against confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the local system, effectively enabling full compromise of the Windows endpoint running the vulnerable Lenovo PC Manager build.

Affected Products

Lenovo PC Manager (lenovo:pcmanager)
Windows endpoints with Lenovo PC Manager preinstalled or user-installed
Consult the Lenovo Security Advisory for the specific fixed build

Discovery Timeline

2025-08-18 - CVE-2025-8098 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-8098

Vulnerability Analysis

Lenovo PC Manager is a system utility that ships on many Lenovo consumer and commercial Windows devices. It provides driver updates, hardware diagnostics, and system optimization features. To perform these tasks, PC Manager installs privileged services and supporting files that run in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

CVE-2025-8098 stems from improper permissions assigned to one or more of these privileged resources. Because the resources are writable or otherwise controllable by non-administrative users, a local attacker with an unprivileged Windows account can influence code paths that ultimately execute at a higher integrity level. The result is a local privilege escalation from a standard user to a privileged context on the host.

Exploitation requires local access and low privileges, but no user interaction. Attackers commonly reach this precondition through phishing payloads, malicious document macros, or by chaining a browser-based flaw before pivoting to this escalation primitive.

Root Cause

The root cause is [CWE-276] Incorrect Default Permissions on Lenovo PC Manager artifacts. When installation assigns overly permissive discretionary access control lists (DACLs) to privileged files, directories, or services, a non-administrative user can modify, replace, or hijack resources loaded by a SYSTEM-level component. Lenovo has not publicly enumerated the specific object or ACL at fault beyond the advisory.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local. An authenticated user on the endpoint interacts with the misconfigured PC Manager component to achieve privilege escalation. Because no user interaction is required beyond the attacker's own actions, malware that lands on a Lenovo endpoint with PC Manager installed can use this flaw as a reliable local escalation step in a broader intrusion chain.

No public proof-of-concept exploit is currently listed, and the vulnerability is not on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The EPSS forecast is low, reflecting limited external exploit signal at time of publication.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-8098

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected file writes or replacements within Lenovo PC Manager installation directories under C:\Program Files\Lenovo\ performed by non-administrative users
Non-Lenovo binaries or unsigned DLLs loaded by Lenovo PC Manager services running as SYSTEM
New scheduled tasks or services created by a Lenovo PC Manager process shortly after standard-user activity
Standard-user processes spawning child processes with elevated integrity levels through Lenovo service handles

Detection Strategies

Enable Windows audit policy for file system and handle manipulation on the Lenovo PC Manager directory tree and correlate writes performed by non-SYSTEM accounts
Alert on Lenovo PC Manager services loading modules from user-writable paths, which indicates DLL search-order or file-replacement abuse
Hunt for standard-user tokens invoking privileged Lenovo IPC endpoints followed by process creation at higher integrity levels

Monitoring Recommendations

Inventory endpoints running Lenovo PC Manager and track installed versions against the fixed build in the Lenovo Security Advisory
Forward Windows Security, Sysmon, and EDR telemetry from Lenovo endpoints to a centralized data lake for retrospective hunts against privilege escalation patterns
Baseline expected Lenovo PC Manager process trees so that anomalous child processes or module loads generate high-fidelity alerts

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-8098

Immediate Actions Required

Update Lenovo PC Manager to the fixed version listed in the Lenovo Security Advisory on all Lenovo Windows endpoints
Restrict local logon on shared or kiosk Lenovo devices until patching is completed
Review DACLs on the Lenovo PC Manager installation directory and remove write permissions for non-administrative principals where safe to do so
Audit accounts with interactive logon rights on Lenovo endpoints and remove unnecessary local access

Patch Information

Lenovo has released a fixed version of PC Manager that corrects the improper permission assignment. Administrators should consult the Lenovo Security Advisory for the specific remediated build number and deploy it through existing software distribution tooling. Because Lenovo PC Manager can auto-update on consumer devices, enterprise fleets that block auto-update need explicit patch approvals.

Workarounds

Uninstall Lenovo PC Manager on endpoints that do not require its functionality, particularly on managed enterprise fleets
Disable or set to manual start any Lenovo PC Manager services that are not required for daily operations
Enforce application allowlisting so that only signed Lenovo binaries from expected paths can execute in privileged contexts

bash

# Query installed Lenovo PC Manager version on a Windows host
powershell -Command "Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Product | Where-Object { $_.Name -like '*Lenovo PC Manager*' } | Select-Object Name, Version"

# Inspect DACLs on the Lenovo PC Manager install directory
icacls "C:\Program Files\Lenovo\LenovoPCManager"

# Stop and disable the service if the workaround path is chosen
sc.exe stop  LenovoPCManagerService
sc.exe config LenovoPCManagerService start= disabled