CVE-2025-68711 Overview
CVE-2025-68711 affects AppLockZ App Lock and Fingerprint Lock version 4.2.11 for Android (applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz). The application implements its locking mechanism as a UI overlay rather than using Android's secure authentication APIs. A local attacker with physical access can bypass the PIN lock by navigating cascading interface flows through exposed routes such as advertisement or browser intents. This permits access to protected applications including Chrome, leading to information disclosure.
Critical Impact
Physical attackers can bypass the PIN lock and access protected applications, resulting in information disclosure and effective privilege escalation within the locked app context.
Affected Products
- AppLockZ App Lock and Fingerprint Lock 4.2.11 for Android
- Package identifier: applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz
- Distribution: Google Play Store
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-05-26 - CVE-2025-68711 published to NVD
- 2026-05-27 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-68711
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-288] Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel. AppLockZ enforces its PIN lock by drawing an overlay on top of protected applications instead of integrating with Android's BiometricPrompt or KeyguardManager APIs. This design choice means the underlying application remains running and accessible if the overlay can be evaded.
The overlay-based approach treats lockscreen verification as a UI concern rather than a security boundary. Any path that routes the user into the protected application without triggering the overlay defeats the lock entirely. Information disclosure and privilege escalation within the protected app context follow once the overlay is bypassed.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of a window overlay as the authentication boundary. Android's secure authentication APIs bind credential verification to the system, while overlays are presentation-layer constructs that can be circumvented by intent routing and navigation flows the developer did not anticipate.
Attack Vector
An attacker with physical access to an unlocked Android device launches an exposed route, such as an advertisement deep link or a browser intent. By navigating cascading interface transitions, the attacker reaches a protected application (for example, Chrome) without the AppLockZ overlay appearing. The protected application is then fully usable, exposing browsing history, saved sessions, and other sensitive data.
No exploitation code is published. The technique relies on interface navigation through exposed Android intents rather than memory corruption or scripted exploitation. See the GitHub CVE-2025-68711 Details for the original disclosure.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-68711
Indicators of Compromise
- Presence of applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz version 4.2.11 on managed Android devices
- User reports of protected applications opening without prompting the AppLockZ PIN screen
- Unexpected foreground transitions from advertisement or browser intents directly into otherwise-locked applications
Detection Strategies
- Inventory installed Android packages through mobile device management (MDM) and flag the affected package and version
- Review application usage logs for sessions in supposedly-locked applications without preceding AppLockZ unlock events
- Audit Android intent activity for unusual deep-link transitions originating from ad SDKs or browsers into protected applications
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable MDM-based application inventory reporting and alert on the vulnerable package identifier
- Forward Android device telemetry to a centralized log platform for cross-device correlation of bypass patterns
- Track user-reported security concerns about app lock failures as a behavioral signal
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-68711
Immediate Actions Required
- Uninstall AppLockZ 4.2.11 (applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz) from affected Android devices
- Replace overlay-based app lockers with solutions that use Android's BiometricPrompt, KeyguardManager, or Work Profile separation
- Enforce device-level screen lock and full-disk encryption to reduce reliance on per-app locking
Patch Information
No vendor patch is referenced in the disclosure. Refer to the GitHub Project Repository and the Google Play App Listing for any future vendor updates. Until a fix is published, treat the application as non-effective for protecting sensitive applications.
Workarounds
- Use Android's native Work Profile or separate user profiles to isolate sensitive applications
- Configure individual applications to require their own in-app authentication where supported (for example, browser app lock features)
- Restrict installation of third-party app lockers through enterprise mobility policies
- Educate users that overlay-based app lockers do not provide a security boundary equivalent to OS-level authentication
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
