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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2025-64307

CVE-2025-64307: Brightpick Robot Control Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2025-64307 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Brightpick Internal Logic Control allowing unauthorized access to robot control functions. Attackers can manipulate runners, assign jobs, and control storage operations. This article covers technical details, system impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2025-64307 Overview

CVE-2025-64307 affects the Brightpick Internal Logic Control (ILC) web interface. The interface exposes robot control functions without requiring any form of authentication. An attacker on an adjacent network can access the interface and manipulate warehouse automation functions directly.

Accessible operations include starting or halting runners, assigning jobs, clearing stations, and deploying storage totes. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. CISA documented the issue in ICS Advisory ICSA-25-317-04.

Critical Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with adjacent network access can issue arbitrary robot control commands, disrupting warehouse operations and manipulating physical automation assets.

Affected Products

  • Brightpick Internal Logic Control (ILC) web interface
  • Brightpick Autopicker robot fleet management functions
  • Brightpick warehouse automation deployments exposing the ILC interface on reachable networks

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-11-15 - CVE-2025-64307 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-64307

Vulnerability Analysis

The Brightpick ILC web interface serves as the control plane for robotic warehouse operations. The interface accepts and executes privileged commands without validating the identity of the requesting user. Any client that can reach the interface over the network can invoke operational endpoints.

The affected functions directly control physical automation. Attackers can start or stop runner robots, reassign jobs between units, clear active stations, and trigger tote deployment from storage. These actions can disrupt fulfillment workflows and create unsafe operational conditions in the warehouse environment.

The attack vector is scoped to adjacent networks. An attacker needs access to the same broadcast or logical network segment hosting the ILC interface. Operational technology (OT) networks that are flat or share connectivity with corporate IT substantially widen the exposure.

Root Cause

The interface was deployed without an authentication layer. Critical control endpoints are directly reachable and act on requests without session validation, credential checks, or role enforcement. This matches CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network reachability to the ILC web interface, no credentials, and no user interaction. An attacker enumerates the interface, identifies control endpoints, and issues HTTP requests to invoke robot operations. See the CISA ICS Advisory and the CSAF advisory JSON for additional technical context.

No verified proof-of-concept code is published. The vulnerability requires no exploitation payload beyond standard HTTP requests to the exposed endpoints.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2025-64307

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected HTTP requests to the Brightpick ILC web interface originating from hosts outside the authorized operator workstations
  • Unscheduled robot start, stop, or reassignment events in warehouse management logs
  • Tote deployment or station clearing operations with no corresponding operator action
  • New or unknown client IP addresses communicating with the ILC control plane

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor HTTP access logs on the ILC interface for requests from unauthorized source addresses or user agents
  • Correlate robot control events with authenticated operator sessions to identify commands with no human origin
  • Baseline normal command rates and alert on anomalous bursts of start, stop, or job assignment operations
  • Enable network flow monitoring on the OT segment hosting Brightpick infrastructure

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward ILC interface logs and OT network telemetry to a centralized SIEM for continuous review
  • Alert on any new client establishing a session with the ILC interface outside maintenance windows
  • Track configuration or job queue changes and reconcile against change management records

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-64307

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the Brightpick ILC web interface using firewall rules or VLAN segmentation so only authorized operator workstations can reach it
  • Place the ILC interface behind a reverse proxy or VPN that enforces authentication before traffic reaches the control plane
  • Contact Brightpick through the vendor contact page to obtain remediation guidance and patch availability
  • Audit historical access logs for signs of unauthorized command execution

Patch Information

No vendor patch is referenced in the published NVD record for CVE-2025-64307. Refer to the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-317-04 and coordinate directly with Brightpick for updated firmware or software releases that enforce authentication on the ILC web interface.

Workarounds

  • Isolate the ILC interface on a dedicated OT network segment with strict ingress filtering
  • Enforce authentication through a network-level gateway such as a VPN concentrator or authenticating reverse proxy
  • Disable or block external access to the ILC interface from corporate IT networks and wireless segments
  • Apply the general ICS network protection practices documented in the CISA ICS Recommended Practices
bash
# Example: restrict access to the ILC interface to a single operator subnet
# Replace <ILC_IP> and <OPERATOR_SUBNET> with environment-specific values
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <ILC_IP> --dport 80 -s <OPERATOR_SUBNET> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <ILC_IP> --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <ILC_IP> --dport 443 -s <OPERATOR_SUBNET> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d <ILC_IP> --dport 443 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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