CVE-2025-62714: Karmada Dashboard Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2025-62714 Overview

CVE-2025-62714 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Karmada Dashboard, a web-based control panel for the Karmada multi-cluster management project. Versions prior to 0.2.0 fail to enforce authentication on backend API endpoints such as /api/v1/secret and /api/v1/service. The web UI requires a valid JSON Web Token (JWT), but the backend API accepts direct requests without any authentication checks. Any actor with network access to the dashboard service can retrieve sensitive cluster data, including Kubernetes Secrets and Service definitions. The flaw is classified as missing authorization [CWE-862].

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers with network access to the Karmada Dashboard can read cluster Secrets and Service objects, exposing credentials and internal service topology across managed Kubernetes clusters.

Affected Products

• Karmada Dashboard versions prior to v0.2.0
• Karmada Dashboard API server (cmd/api/app)
• Karmada Dashboard web server (cmd/web/app)

Discovery Timeline

• 2025-10-24 - CVE-2025-62714 published to NVD
• 2026-04-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-62714

Vulnerability Analysis

The Karmada Dashboard splits authentication enforcement between the web UI and the backend API. The web UI gates user sessions with JWT validation, but the API route group registered under /api/v1 was set up without attaching the AuthMiddleware handler. As a result, REST endpoints handling cluster resources accept anonymous requests directly. An attacker reaching the API listener over the network can issue GET requests against routes such as /api/v1/secret or /api/v1/service and receive raw Kubernetes resource data. Secrets typically contain service-account tokens, image-pull credentials, and application secrets. Disclosure of this material enables lateral movement into managed member clusters and downstream workloads.

Root Cause

The API router defined in cmd/api/app/router/setup.go registered the v1 route group without invoking v1.Use(AuthMiddleware()). The middleware existed in the codebase but was never bound to the API route tree, leaving every handler reachable without an Authorization header. This is a missing authorization defect rather than a broken authentication mechanism.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only network reachability to the dashboard API service. No credentials, user interaction, or specialized tooling is needed. An attacker sends an unauthenticated HTTP request to an exposed /api/v1/* endpoint and parses the JSON response. Where the dashboard is exposed via an Ingress, LoadBalancer, or NodePort without network restrictions, exposure extends to the public internet.

// Patch: cmd/api/app/router/setup.go
// Source: https://github.com/karmada-io/dashboard/commit/d2d04909f25e96b4c20fa6b636c398bd1636ee06
router = gin.Default()
_ = router.SetTrustedProxies(nil)
v1 = router.Group("/api/v1")
+v1.Use(AuthMiddleware())
+v1.Use(ClientMiddleware())
member = v1.Group("/member/:clustername")
member.Use(EnsureMemberClusterMiddleware())

The follow-up patch in cmd/api/app/router/middleware.go also accepts the Authorization value via a query parameter for terminal sessions, while still rejecting requests that supply neither header nor query token.

// Patch: cmd/api/app/router/middleware.go
// Source: https://github.com/karmada-io/dashboard/commit/8457b8bb87725e2371a638ca5a255fd2895c70f1
func AuthMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
    return func(c *gin.Context) {
-       if c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
+       if c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" && c.Query("Authorization") == "" {
            c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, common.BaseResponse{
                Code: http.StatusUnauthorized,
                Msg:  "Forbidden",
            })
            return
        }
+       if c.Request.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" && c.Query("Authorization") != "" {
+           c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", c.Query("Authorization"))
+       }
        c.Next()
    }
}

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-62714

Indicators of Compromise

• HTTP requests to /api/v1/secret, /api/v1/service, or other /api/v1/* paths on the Karmada Dashboard without an Authorization header.
• Successful 200 OK responses to API requests originating from non-dashboard client IP ranges.
• Anomalous outbound data volumes from the dashboard pod to external networks.

Detection Strategies

• Inspect reverse-proxy, Ingress, and Kubernetes audit logs for requests to /api/v1/* endpoints that lack a bearer token.
• Compare API access logs against the set of users known to hold dashboard JWTs and flag mismatches.
• Run authenticated scans against deployed dashboards to confirm the installed version is v0.2.0 or later.

Monitoring Recommendations

• Forward Karmada Dashboard access logs and Kubernetes audit logs to a central SIEM for retention and correlation.
• Alert on bursts of GET requests against secret-bearing endpoints from a single source IP.
• Track read operations against Karmada-managed Secret and ServiceAccount resources by the dashboard service account.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-62714

Immediate Actions Required

• Upgrade Karmada Dashboard to v0.2.0 or later, which binds AuthMiddleware to the /api/v1 route group.
• Restrict network access to the dashboard service using NetworkPolicy, Ingress allowlists, or a VPN-only exposure model until patching is complete.
• Rotate any Kubernetes Secrets, service-account tokens, and credentials that were reachable via the exposed API.

Patch Information

The fix is delivered in GitHub Release v0.2.0 and tracked under GHSA-5qjg-9mjh-4r92. The relevant code changes are in Pull Request #271 and Pull Request #280, which add the missing middleware registration and refine the token-source handling.

Workarounds

• Place the dashboard behind an authenticating reverse proxy that rejects requests without a validated bearer token.
• Apply a Kubernetes NetworkPolicy that limits ingress to the dashboard pod to a trusted management subnet.
• Disable or scale the dashboard Deployment to zero replicas in environments where it is not actively required.

# Example NetworkPolicy restricting ingress to the Karmada Dashboard
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: karmada-dashboard-restrict
  namespace: karmada-system
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: karmada-dashboard
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - ipBlock:
        cidr: 10.0.0.0/24
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8000
EOF