CVE-2025-60250: Unitree Robotics BLE Encryption Vulnerability

CVE-2025-60250 Overview

CVE-2025-60250 affects Unitree Go2, G1, H1, and B2 robotic platforms through firmware builds dated 2025-09-20. The devices decrypt Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) packet data using a hardcoded AES key (df98b715d5c6ed2b25817b6f2554124a) and a static initialization vector (2841ae97419c2973296a0d4bdfe19a4f). Because the key and IV are embedded in the firmware and shared across devices, any attacker within BLE range can decrypt and forge protocol traffic. The weakness is classified under [CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key].

Critical Impact
An adjacent attacker can decrypt BLE communications and inject crafted packets into Unitree robots, undermining the confidentiality and integrity of the BLE control channel.

Affected Products

Unitree Go2 quadruped robots (firmware through 2025-09-20)
Unitree G1 and H1 humanoid robots (firmware through 2025-09-20)
Unitree B2 industrial quadruped (firmware through 2025-09-20)

Discovery Timeline

2025-09-26 - CVE-2025-60250 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-60250

Vulnerability Analysis

Unitree robots expose a BLE provisioning and control interface used by the mobile companion application. The firmware wraps BLE payloads in an AES-encrypted layer intended to prevent eavesdropping and command tampering over the air. However, the symmetric key and IV used for this layer are hardcoded in the firmware image and identical across every shipped unit of the Go2, G1, H1, and B2 product lines.

An attacker within BLE range (approximately 10 meters, extendable with directional antennas) can passively capture encrypted packets and decrypt them offline. The same key and IV also permit crafting valid ciphertexts, which the robot will accept and process. Public proof-of-concept code demonstrating the decryption and packet forgery is published in the UniPwn repository, and the broader exploit chain is covered in IEEE Spectrum's analysis.

Root Cause

The root cause is a design flaw: a static AES key and IV embedded in firmware and reused across all devices in a product family. There is no per-device key derivation, no key exchange, and no session randomness. Extracting the key once from any single device compromises every device globally. This pattern maps directly to [CWE-321].

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires adjacency to the target robot over BLE. The attacker scans for the Unitree BLE service, captures the GATT traffic, and applies the known key and IV to recover plaintext command structures. The attacker can then construct encrypted BLE writes that the robot's firmware authenticates as legitimate app traffic. This vulnerability is commonly chained with other Unitree issues to reach command execution on the robot's control plane. See the UniPwn PoC for implementation details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-60250

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected BLE pairing or GATT write activity directed at Unitree devices outside of normal operator sessions
Unitree robots executing motion or configuration commands that do not correlate with authorized operator input
Presence of nearby BLE scanners or unknown Bluetooth-capable devices in facilities operating Unitree robots

Detection Strategies

Perform periodic Bluetooth spectrum sweeps around operational areas to identify unauthorized BLE central devices targeting Unitree MAC prefixes
Correlate robot command logs with authenticated operator sessions and alert on commands lacking a matching user action
Monitor firmware integrity on fleet devices and flag units whose firmware predates vendor remediation

Monitoring Recommendations

Centralize robot telemetry and operator-app logs in a SIEM for cross-correlation of command events
Track BLE connection counts per robot and alert on connections from unknown client identifiers
Enroll robot operations networks in continuous monitoring and triage anomalous behavior through tooling such as the Singularity Platform and Singularity Data Lake for retention and analytics

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-60250

Immediate Actions Required

Inventory all Unitree Go2, G1, H1, and B2 units and record firmware versions against the 2025-09-20 cutoff
Restrict robot operation to physically controlled areas where BLE eavesdroppers cannot approach within radio range
Disable BLE provisioning when not actively pairing and power down robots when unattended

Patch Information

At time of writing, Unitree has not published a vendor advisory URL in the referenced sources. Operators should contact Unitree support directly for firmware updates addressing the hardcoded key and IV, and verify that any released build introduces per-device key material and session-level randomness.

Workarounds

Operate robots only in RF-shielded or access-controlled environments to limit BLE exposure
Use the wired or Wi-Fi management interface over an isolated network segment instead of BLE where supported
Monitor for and physically investigate unknown BLE devices in proximity to robot operations

bash

# Example: scan for nearby BLE devices to baseline the RF environment
sudo hcitool lescan --duplicates
sudo bluetoothctl scan on