CVE-2025-58180: OctoPrint RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2025-58180 Overview

OctoPrint is a widely deployed web interface for controlling consumer 3D printers. CVE-2025-58180 is an authenticated command injection vulnerability affecting OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.2. An authenticated attacker can upload a file with a specially crafted filename that, when referenced by a configured system event handler, results in arbitrary command execution. The flaw maps to CWE-78: OS Command Injection. Exploitation requires that the OctoPrint administrator has configured event handlers executing system commands with uploaded filenames as parameters. The vulnerability is patched in version 1.11.3.

Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers on an adjacent network can achieve arbitrary command execution on the OctoPrint host by uploading files with shell metacharacters in their names, when filename placeholders are referenced by system event handlers.

Affected Products

OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.2
OctoPrint instances with event handlers using filename-based placeholders in system commands
OctoPrint deployments where feature.enforceReallyUniversalFilenames is not enabled

Discovery Timeline

2025-09-09 - CVE-2025-58180 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2025-09-09 - GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-49mj-x8jp-qvfc released
2025-09-09 - Patch released in OctoPrint 1.11.3
2025-09-18 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-58180

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is an OS command injection issue rooted in insufficient sanitization of uploaded filenames. OctoPrint supports user-configurable event handlers that can execute system commands when specific events occur. Administrators commonly use filename placeholders inside these command templates so the relevant file is passed as an argument. When OctoPrint substitutes the placeholder with a filename containing shell metacharacters, the resulting command string is interpreted by the system shell. An authenticated user with upload privileges can therefore craft a filename embedding additional shell commands. Once the matching event fires, those commands run with the privileges of the OctoPrint process.

Root Cause

The sanitization routine for uploaded filenames did not strip shell metacharacters such as ;, |, &, ?, $, *, <, and >, nor unprintable ASCII control characters. The fix in src/octoprint/util/files.py extends _sfn_really_universal to remove these characters before the filename is stored, preventing command injection regardless of how the filename is later interpolated into shell commands.

Attack Vector

An authenticated attacker on an adjacent network uploads a file whose name contains shell metacharacters and a payload. When an administrator-configured event handler that uses a filename placeholder is triggered, OctoPrint constructs and executes a shell command containing the attacker-controlled filename. The injected payload executes in the OctoPrint host context. If no event handlers reference filename placeholders, the vulnerability is not exploitable.

python

 import logging
 import os.path
 import re
+import string
 
+_UNPRINTABLE_ASCII = "".join(chr(c) for c in range(128) if chr(c) not in string.printable)
+_STRIPPED_FILE_NAME_CHARS = ";|&?$*<>" + _UNPRINTABLE_ASCII
+_STRIPPED_FILE_NAME_RE = re.compile(
+    f"[{re.escape(_STRIPPED_FILE_NAME_CHARS):s}]", re.UNICODE
+)

+### taken from pathvalidate library
+_WINDOWS_RESERVED_FILE_NAMES = ("CON", "PRN", "AUX", "CLOCK$", "NUL") + tuple(
+    f"{name:s}{num:d}" for name, num in itertools.product(("COM", "LPT"), range(1, 10))
+)
+_MACOS_RESERVED_FILE_NAMES = (":",)

+def _sfn_really_universal(name):
+    from octoprint.util.text import sanitize

Source: OctoPrint patch commit c3a9409

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-58180

Indicators of Compromise

Files in the OctoPrint uploads directory whose names contain shell metacharacters such as ;, |, &, $, *, <, or >
Unexpected child processes spawned by the OctoPrint process around the time of an event trigger such as upload, print start, or print done
Outbound network connections initiated by processes spawned by OctoPrint that do not match normal printer control workflows
Modifications to the OctoPrint config.yaml event handler section by non-administrative accounts

Detection Strategies

Audit the OctoPrint uploads directory for filenames containing characters outside the printable filename character set and quarantine suspicious files
Inspect process creation telemetry for sh, bash, or cmd.exe children of the OctoPrint Python process with command lines containing upload filenames
Review OctoPrint event handler configuration in config.yaml to enumerate every command template that interpolates a filename placeholder

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable verbose OctoPrint logging for event handler execution and forward logs to a central collector for review
Monitor file upload events on the OctoPrint host filesystem and alert on filenames containing shell metacharacters
Track the OctoPrint process tree continuously and alert on any spawned shell or interpreter not normally invoked during printing

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-58180

Immediate Actions Required

Upgrade OctoPrint to version 1.11.3 or later, which contains the filename sanitization fix
Audit all configured event handlers and disable any that reference filename-based placeholders until the upgrade is verified
Review existing uploads and delete any files with suspicious names containing shell metacharacters or unprintable characters
Restrict OctoPrint network exposure so the web interface is not reachable from untrusted networks

Patch Information

OctoPrint released the fix in version 1.11.3. The patch is implemented in commits be4201e and c3a9409, updating _sfn_really_universal in src/octoprint/util/files.py to strip dangerous characters. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-49mj-x8jp-qvfc for full details.

Workarounds

In the GUI Event Manager, disable every event handler that uses filename placeholders by unchecking the Enabled checkbox or setting enabled to False in config.yaml
Set feature.enforceReallyUniversalFilenames to true in config.yaml and restart OctoPrint to enforce stricter filename sanitization
Vet existing uploads after enabling enforcement and delete any files with suspicious names
Limit access to the OctoPrint web interface to trusted users and trusted network segments only

bash

# Configuration example - config.yaml
feature:
  enforceReallyUniversalFilenames: true

events:
  subscriptions:
    - event: Upload
      command: "/usr/local/bin/process.sh {filename}"
      type: system
      enabled: false   # disable until upgraded to 1.11.3