Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2025-5760 Overview
The Simple History plugin for WordPress logs user passwords in plaintext when Detective Mode is enabled. The flaw resides in the append_debug_info_to_context() function in versions prior to 5.8.1. The logger captures the entire contents of $_POST, and sometimes raw request bodies or $_GET, without redacting password-related keys. Any login event, whether through native wp_login or third-party login widgets, writes the submitted password into the activity log in clear text. Administrators or any account with database read access can retrieve every captured credential by reading those log entries. The issue is categorized as unprotected storage of credentials [CWE-256].
Critical Impact
Plaintext passwords for every user who logs in while Detective Mode is active are exposed to anyone with log or database read access.
Affected Products
- Simple History plugin for WordPress, versions prior to 5.8.1
- WordPress sites with Detective Mode enabled in the plugin settings
- Third-party login widgets integrated with Simple History logging
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-06-06 - CVE-2025-5760 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-5760
Vulnerability Analysis
Simple History's Detective Mode is a diagnostic feature that records contextual request data alongside each logged event. The append_debug_info_to_context() function serialized the full $_POST superglobal, and in some execution paths also captured raw request bodies and $_GET parameters. The logger lacked a denylist for sensitive field names such as pwd, password, user_pass, or custom login fields used by third-party plugins. Every form submission that triggered an audited event, including login, password reset, and user registration, wrote the submitted credentials verbatim into the Simple History log table.
Exploitation requires high privileges because an attacker needs read access to the plugin's log entries, typically through an administrator account or direct database access. However, the data exposed is not the attacker's own, it is credentials belonging to every user who authenticated during the window Detective Mode was enabled.
Root Cause
The plugin applied no field-name filtering before serializing request data into log context. Password values transited the logger unredacted and were persisted to the WordPress database in clear text, violating secure credential storage requirements [CWE-256].
Attack Vector
A site administrator enables Detective Mode for troubleshooting. Users then authenticate through wp-login.php or any login form hooked into WordPress authentication. Each login event is written to the Simple History log with the raw pwd POST parameter embedded in the context JSON. An attacker who later gains administrator access, obtains a database dump, or exploits any secondary flaw that exposes log tables harvests all captured passwords.
// Patch excerpt from dropins/class-detective-mode-dropin.php
public function settings_field_detective_mode() {
$detective_mode_enabled = Helpers::detective_mode_is_enabled();
?>
<label>
<input <?php checked( $detective_mode_enabled ); ?> type="checkbox" value="1" name="simple_history_detective_mode_enabled" />
The 5.8.1 release notes describe the fix: "Mask more password related fields when using Detective Mode" and "Remove raw post data from Detective Mode data, since it may contain sensitive data that is difficult to clean." Source: GitHub Commit 68eab0c.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-5760
Indicators of Compromise
- Simple History log rows containing pwd, password, user_pass, or log keys with non-empty string values inside the serialized context column.
- Presence of the simple_history_detective_mode_enabled option set to 1 in wp_options.
- Entries in wp_simple_history_contexts referencing raw POST bodies for authentication endpoints such as wp-login.php.
Detection Strategies
- Query the wp_simple_history_contexts table for any row where the value column contains credential field names and inspect for plaintext secrets.
- Audit installed Simple History plugin versions across managed WordPress sites and flag any below 5.8.1.
- Review access logs for administrator reads against Simple History pages that could indicate credential harvesting from the log viewer.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on new administrator sessions that export or view large volumes of Simple History log entries.
- Monitor database queries that read from Simple History tables outside normal plugin UI usage patterns.
- Track configuration changes toggling Detective Mode on production sites.
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-5760
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Simple History to version 5.8.1 or later on every WordPress installation.
- Disable Detective Mode immediately on any site still running an affected version.
- Purge existing Simple History log entries that may contain captured plaintext passwords.
- Force a password reset for every user who authenticated while Detective Mode was enabled.
Patch Information
The fix is implemented in WordPress Changeset 3267487 and GitHub Commit 68eab0c. The patch expands the masked field list and removes raw POST data from Detective Mode context. See GitHub Issue #546 and the Wordfence Vulnerability Report for additional detail.
Workarounds
- Keep Detective Mode disabled until upgrading to 5.8.1 or later, per the Simple History Support Guide.
- Restrict database and administrator access to the WordPress site to the minimum required personnel.
- Rotate any credentials that may have been written to logs and expire active sessions.
# Verify installed plugin version and disable Detective Mode via WP-CLI
wp plugin get simple-history --field=version
wp option update simple_history_detective_mode_enabled 0
wp plugin update simple-history --version=5.8.1
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

