CVE-2025-54467: NeuVector Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2025-54467 Overview

CVE-2025-54467 is an information disclosure vulnerability in NeuVector, the open-source container security platform. When NeuVector's process rule engine terminates a Java command that contains password parameters on its command line, the full command string, including plaintext credentials, is written to the NeuVector security event log. Any operator or downstream system with access to the security event log can then read the exposed credentials. The weakness is tracked under CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials.

Critical Impact
Plaintext passwords passed as Java command-line arguments are persisted in NeuVector security event logs when a Process rule violation triggers termination, exposing credentials to anyone with log access.

Affected Products

NeuVector container security platform (see GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-w54x-xfxg-4gxq)
SUSE-distributed NeuVector packages (see SUSE Bug Report CVE-2025-54467)
Deployments relying on NeuVector Process rules to terminate Java workloads

Discovery Timeline

2025-09-17 - CVE-2025-54467 published to NVD
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-54467

Vulnerability Analysis

NeuVector monitors container processes and can terminate any process that violates a configured Process rule. When the enforcement engine kills a process, it emits a security event describing the offending command. For Java workloads, applications commonly accept credentials through arguments such as -Dpassword=<secret>, --password <secret>, or JDBC connection strings. NeuVector records the full argv string of the terminated process without redacting these parameters. The resulting security event stores the plaintext password in the log stream, where it can be read by NeuVector administrators, forwarded to SIEM systems, or archived to long-term storage. This turns a defensive enforcement action into a credential exposure path.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing sanitization of process command-line data before it is written to the security event log. NeuVector treats the argv array as opaque diagnostic text and does not strip or mask known sensitive tokens such as password, passwd, pwd, or JDBC URL credentials. [CWE-522] applies because the credential is not protected in transit to the log sink or at rest inside it.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is passive. An attacker who already has read access to NeuVector security events, whether directly, through a SIEM forwarder, or via a log archive, can harvest credentials that were legitimately used by workloads. Alternatively, an attacker who can influence a Process rule to fire against a targeted Java service, for example by mimicking a blocked binary name, can force credentialed commands to be logged. The vulnerability does not enable code execution or integrity impact, but the leaked credentials can be reused against upstream systems.

No public proof-of-concept or exploit tooling is listed for CVE-2025-54467, and it is not present in the CISA KEV catalog. The EPSS probability is 0.231%.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-54467

Indicators of Compromise

NeuVector security events of type Process.Violation or Process.Denied whose command field contains substrings such as password=, --password, -Dpassword, or jdbc: with embedded credentials.
Log forwarder pipelines (Fluentd, Fluent Bit, syslog) carrying NeuVector events that include Java argv strings with credential tokens.
Historical SIEM records of terminated Java processes retaining command-line arguments in cleartext.

Detection Strategies

Search NeuVector security event logs for regex patterns matching common credential flags in Java command lines and alert on matches.
Correlate NeuVector Process rule terminations with credential-token patterns to identify prior exposures already stored in log archives.
Review Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) on NeuVector logs and any downstream SIEM index that ingests NeuVector events to confirm least-privilege access.

Monitoring Recommendations

Ingest NeuVector events into a centralized platform and apply data-loss-prevention rules that flag credential patterns before indexing.
Rotate any credentials found in existing NeuVector event history and track rotation completion as a remediation metric.
Monitor for new Process rules that would target Java binaries, since a rule change can indirectly increase the volume of credential-bearing terminations.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-54467

Immediate Actions Required

Upgrade NeuVector to the fixed release identified in GHSA-w54x-xfxg-4gxq and the corresponding SUSE advisory.
Search existing NeuVector security event logs and connected SIEM indices for exposed credentials, then rotate any that are found.
Restrict access to NeuVector event logs and forwarders to authorized administrators only.

Patch Information

SUSE and the NeuVector project have issued fixed builds through the referenced advisories. Apply the vendor-supplied update that removes credential material from process termination events. Confirm the patched controller and enforcer versions are consistent across all clusters before closing remediation tickets.

Workarounds

Configure Java workloads to read credentials from environment variables, mounted secrets, or Kubernetes Secret objects instead of command-line arguments.
Redact credential tokens in the log-forwarding pipeline using pattern-based scrubbing before events reach the SIEM or archive.
Reduce the retention window on NeuVector security event storage until patched builds are deployed.

bash

# Example Fluent Bit filter to redact common Java credential arguments
# before NeuVector events are forwarded to the SIEM
[FILTER]
    Name          modify
    Match         neuvector.*
    Condition     Key_value_matches log (password=|--password |-Dpassword=|pwd=)

[FILTER]
    Name          lua
    Match         neuvector.*
    script        redact.lua
    call          redact_secrets

# redact.lua
# function redact_secrets(tag, ts, record)
#   if record["log"] then
#     record["log"] = string.gsub(record["log"],
#       "(password=)[^%s\"]+", "%1[REDACTED]")
#     record["log"] = string.gsub(record["log"],
#       "(-Dpassword=)[^%s\"]+", "%1[REDACTED]")
#   end
#   return 2, ts, record
# end