Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2025-49087 Overview
CVE-2025-49087 is a timing side-channel vulnerability in Mbed TLS, an open-source cryptographic library maintained by TrustedFirmware. The flaw affects versions 3.6.1 through 3.6.3 and is fixed in 3.6.4. A timing discrepancy during block cipher padding removal allows a network-based attacker to recover plaintext when PKCS#7 padding mode is used. The weakness is tracked as [CWE-385: Covert Timing Channel]. Exploitation requires precise measurement conditions and does not affect integrity or availability, only confidentiality of encrypted data.
Critical Impact
An attacker observing cryptographic operation timing can recover plaintext from CBC-mode traffic protected by Mbed TLS when PKCS#7 padding is in use.
Affected Products
- Mbed TLS 3.6.1
- Mbed TLS 3.6.2
- Mbed TLS 3.6.3
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-07-20 - CVE-2025-49087 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-49087
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability belongs to the class of padding oracle attacks against block cipher modes that rely on PKCS#7 padding. When Mbed TLS removes padding after decryption, the code path exposes a measurable timing difference based on whether the padding bytes are valid. An attacker who can submit chosen ciphertexts and measure processing time can distinguish valid from invalid padding. Repeated measurements reveal plaintext bytes one at a time.
The issue is classified under [CWE-385: Covert Timing Channel]. It mirrors prior Lucky 13 and padding oracle research against TLS CBC cipher suites. Exploitation requires network access to a service using the affected library and the ability to trigger decryption of attacker-influenced ciphertexts.
Root Cause
The root cause is non-constant-time handling of PKCS#7 padding removal in the block cipher module. Secure cryptographic code must process padding in a way that takes identical time regardless of padding validity. The affected Mbed TLS versions deviate from this constant-time property, producing a side channel observable over the network.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based with high attack complexity. The attacker must observe or infer decryption timings for ciphertexts they control or influence. Noise, jitter, and server load reduce signal quality, which is why the CVSS vector reflects high complexity. See the GitHub Mbed TLS Security Advisory for technical details on the affected code paths.
No public proof-of-concept exploit code is available for this issue at the time of writing.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-49087
Indicators of Compromise
- Repeated decryption failures from the same client against a service using Mbed TLS CBC-mode cipher suites.
- Unusually high volumes of malformed or truncated ciphertext submissions targeting cryptographic endpoints.
- Long-lived sessions issuing systematic byte-pattern variations in encrypted payloads.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory all embedded devices, firmware, and services that statically or dynamically link mbedtls to identify versions 3.6.1 through 3.6.3.
- Monitor application logs for anomalous rates of padding or MAC validation failures returned by Mbed TLS APIs.
- Correlate traffic patterns against known padding oracle probing behavior, including slow sequential ciphertext mutations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable detailed logging on TLS termination points to capture decryption error counts per source address.
- Alert on sustained connection patterns consistent with timing measurement campaigns, such as fixed-interval requests with varying ciphertext trailers.
- Track outbound library version telemetry across endpoints and IoT fleets to confirm patch adoption.
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-49087
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Mbed TLS to version 3.6.4 or later across all affected systems, firmware images, and dependent products.
- Audit custom builds and vendor SDKs that bundle Mbed TLS to confirm the embedded version has been updated.
- Prefer AEAD cipher suites such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 over CBC with PKCS#7 padding where protocol choice permits.
Patch Information
TrustedFirmware addressed the vulnerability in Mbed TLS 3.6.4. Refer to the Mbed TLS Security Advisories Update and the GitHub Mbed TLS Security Advisory for release notes and the specific patch commits.
Workarounds
- Disable CBC-mode cipher suites that rely on PKCS#7 padding in TLS and application-layer configurations.
- Restrict network exposure of services performing decryption with Mbed TLS to trusted segments until the patch is deployed.
- Rate-limit decryption endpoints to raise the cost of timing measurement campaigns.
# Configuration example: prefer AEAD cipher suites and disable CBC
# OpenSSL-style cipher string illustrating AEAD-only selection
TLS_CIPHERS="ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

