CVE-2025-47760: Fujielectric Monitouch V-sft Buffer Overflow

CVE-2025-47760 Overview

CVE-2025-47760 is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Fuji Electric V-SFT v6.2.5.0 and earlier. The flaw resides in the VS6MemInIF!set_temp_type_default function within the V-SFT screen editor software used to design human-machine interface (HMI) screens for Monitouch operator panels. Opening a specially crafted V7 or V8 project file triggers the overflow. Successful exploitation may lead to application crash, information disclosure, or arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running V-SFT. The weakness is tracked under [CWE-121] (Stack-based Buffer Overflow) and [CWE-787] (Out-of-bounds Write).

Critical Impact
An attacker who convinces an engineer to open a malicious V7 or V8 file can execute arbitrary code on the engineering workstation, potentially pivoting into operational technology (OT) environments.

Affected Products

Fuji Electric Monitouch V-SFT v6.2.5.0
Fuji Electric Monitouch V-SFT versions prior to v6.2.5.0
V7 and V8 project file parsers within the V-SFT v6 editor

Discovery Timeline

2025-05-19 - CVE-2025-47760 published to NVD
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-47760

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the set_temp_type_default function exported by the VS6MemInIF module of V-SFT v6. When the editor loads a V7 or V8 project file, this function processes structured data from the file without adequately validating the size of attacker-controlled fields before copying them onto the stack. The result is a classic stack-based buffer overflow that overwrites adjacent stack memory, including saved return addresses and structured exception handler (SEH) records on Windows.

Exploitation requires local user interaction. An engineer must open the crafted file within V-SFT. Because V-SFT is used to design HMI screens deployed to industrial Monitouch panels, engineering workstations are attractive targets for adversaries seeking a foothold in OT networks.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing bounds checking during parsing of V7/V8 file structures inside VS6MemInIF!set_temp_type_default. A field length or offset read from the file is trusted and used directly in a stack copy operation, allowing an attacker-controlled buffer to exceed the destination size and corrupt the stack frame.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local and requires user interaction. An attacker crafts a malicious .V7 or .V8 project file and delivers it through phishing, a shared engineering repository, a supplier hand-off, or removable media. When an operator opens the file in V-SFT, the parser triggers the overflow. Given the write-what-where nature of stack corruption on Windows, an attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the V-SFT user, which typically includes rights to modify HMI project files and deploy them to production panels.

No verified public proof-of-concept code is available for this vulnerability at the time of publication. Refer to the JVN Vulnerability Report for coordinated disclosure details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-47760

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected crashes of V-SFT.exe or faulting module VS6MemInIF.dll recorded in Windows Application Event Log entries (Event ID 1000).
V7 or V8 project files received from untrusted sources, especially those with unusually large embedded structures or malformed headers.
Child processes spawned by V-SFT.exe such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
Outbound network connections initiated by V-SFT.exe, which normally operates offline on engineering workstations.

Detection Strategies

Hunt for anomalous process lineage where V-SFT.exe is the parent of scripting or living-off-the-land binaries.
Monitor for Windows Error Reporting (WER) artifacts referencing VS6MemInIF faulting modules and access violation exceptions (0xC0000005).
Inspect email gateways and file shares for .V7 and .V8 attachments originating outside the trusted engineering supply chain.

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable command-line and process creation auditing (Windows Event ID 4688) on engineering workstations running V-SFT.
Forward endpoint telemetry from OT engineering hosts into a centralized SIEM or data lake for correlation with file-open events.
Track file-write operations targeting HMI project directories to identify unauthorized modification of .V7 and .V8 assets.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-47760

Immediate Actions Required

Update V-SFT v6 to the latest fixed release available from the Fuji Electric Monitouch download portal.
Restrict V-SFT installations to dedicated engineering workstations that are segmented from corporate email and general internet browsing.
Only open .V7 and .V8 files received from verified, trusted sources, and validate cryptographic hashes when possible.

Patch Information

Fuji Electric provides updated V-SFT v6 installers through the official Monitouch download portal. Administrators should verify the installed version is later than v6.2.5.0. Coordinated disclosure details are available in the JVN Vulnerability Report JVNVU97228144.

Workarounds

Isolate V-SFT engineering workstations on a dedicated VLAN with no direct internet access.
Enforce application allowlisting to prevent child processes from spawning under V-SFT.exe.
Enable Windows Defender Exploit Guard mitigations such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) for the V-SFT.exe process.
Handle project files from third parties in a sandboxed virtual machine before importing them into production engineering environments.

bash

# Configuration example: enforce process mitigations for V-SFT on Windows
Set-ProcessMitigation -Name "V-SFT.exe" -Enable DEP,SEHOP,ForceRelocateImages,BottomUp,HighEntropy,CFG
Set-ProcessMitigation -Name "V-SFT.exe" -Enable StrictHandle,DisableExtensionPoints,BlockDynamicCode