CVE-2025-43321: Apple macOS Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

CVE-2025-43321 Overview

CVE-2025-43321 is a medium-severity access control weakness [CWE-284] affecting Apple macOS on Intel-based Macs. The flaw allowed unsigned services to launch on the operating system, enabling a malicious application to bypass Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) boundaries and reach protected user data. Apple addressed the issue by blocking unsigned services from launching on Intel Macs. The fix ships in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, and macOS Tahoe 26. Exploitation requires local access and user interaction, and there is no evidence of in-the-wild abuse.

Critical Impact
A locally installed application can read files and resources protected by macOS privacy controls, including user documents, photos, and application data folders.

Affected Products

Apple macOS Sequoia prior to 15.7 (Intel Macs)
Apple macOS Sonoma prior to 14.8 (Intel Macs)
Apple macOS Tahoe prior to 26

Discovery Timeline

2025-09-15 - CVE-2025-43321 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-43321

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from improper access control [CWE-284] in the macOS service launch path on Intel hardware. Prior to the patch, macOS would launch services on Intel Macs without enforcing a code-signature requirement. An attacker delivering a malicious application could plant an unsigned helper service and have launchd execute it in a context that inherited or negotiated broader privacy entitlements than intended. The result is unauthorized access to data protected by the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework.

Exploitation is limited to local scenarios and requires the user to run the malicious application. The attacker cannot execute arbitrary code as root through this issue alone, and integrity and availability of the host are not directly impacted. The primary risk is confidentiality of user data.

Root Cause

Apple's advisories describe the root cause as the ability of unsigned services to launch on Intel Macs. Without signature validation, any attacker-controlled binary placed in an expected service location could run through legitimate launch mechanisms and inherit access to protected resources.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local. An attacker must convince the user to install and run a malicious application. Once executed, the application registers or drops an unsigned service that is launched by the operating system, giving the attacker code execution paths that can enumerate and exfiltrate TCC-protected user data such as documents, downloads, and application-scoped folders. See the Apple Support Advisory #125110, Apple Support Advisory #125111, and Apple Support Advisory #125112 for vendor detail.

No public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2025-43321.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-43321

Indicators of Compromise

Unsigned or ad-hoc signed binaries registered as LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons under ~/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, or /Library/LaunchDaemons.
New plist service definitions pointing to executables outside standard Apple or notarized-app paths.
Unexpected reads of TCC-protected locations such as ~/Documents, ~/Downloads, ~/Library/Application Support, or ~/Library/Messages by non-notarized processes.

Detection Strategies

Query endpoint telemetry for launchctl load or launchctl bootstrap operations referencing binaries with missing or invalid code-signature attributes.
Alert on child processes of launchd whose parent plist was created within the last 24 hours by a non-Apple installer.
Correlate application installs with subsequent access to files under user home directories protected by TCC.

Monitoring Recommendations

Baseline the set of LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons on managed Intel Macs and flag deviations.
Monitor spctl and codesign verification failures generated during service startup.
Track macOS version telemetry to confirm all Intel endpoints have moved to 15.7, 14.8, or 26.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-43321

Immediate Actions Required

Update Intel Macs to macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, or macOS Tahoe 26 as soon as validated in your environment.
Audit installed LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons for unsigned binaries and remove any that are not required.
Restrict user ability to install unsigned or non-notarized applications through MDM policy.

Patch Information

Apple resolved the issue by blocking unsigned services from launching on Intel Macs. The fix is included in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, and macOS Tahoe 26. Refer to Apple Support Advisory #125111 and Apple Support Advisory #125112 for the applicable update packages.

Workarounds

Enforce Gatekeeper in its strictest mode so only App Store and identified-developer applications can execute.
Deploy MDM configuration profiles that block user-installed LaunchAgents in ~/Library/LaunchAgents.
Limit administrative privileges on Intel Macs to reduce the ability to write to system-level launch directories.

bash

# Configuration example: verify Gatekeeper enforcement and audit LaunchAgents
sudo spctl --status
sudo spctl --master-enable

# List LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons and check code signatures
for path in /Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchDaemons ~/Library/LaunchAgents; do
  for plist in "$path"/*.plist; do
    [ -f "$plist" ] || continue
    bin=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "Print :ProgramArguments:0" "$plist" 2>/dev/null)
    [ -n "$bin" ] && codesign -dv --verbose=2 "$bin" 2>&1 | grep -E "Signature|Authority|not signed"
  done
done