CVE-2025-24517 Overview
CVE-2025-24517 is a client-side authentication vulnerability affecting the CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini (IB-MCT001), an industrial camera device used in production line monitoring. The vulnerability stems from the improper use of client-side authentication mechanisms, allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication controls and obtain the product login password without proper authentication.
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-603 (Use of Client-Side Authentication), which describes scenarios where critical authentication decisions are made on the client-side rather than being securely handled by the server. In this case, attackers can exploit the flawed authentication implementation to extract credentials directly from the device.
Critical Impact
Remote unauthenticated attackers can obtain login passwords from affected CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini devices, potentially compromising industrial surveillance systems and production line monitoring infrastructure.
Affected Products
- CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini (IB-MCT001) - All versions
- Inaba Denki Sangyo Co., Ltd. production line camera systems
- Industrial control system (ICS) camera infrastructure using affected firmware
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-03-31 - CVE-2025-24517 published to NVD
- 2026-04-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-24517
Vulnerability Analysis
The CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini camera implements authentication logic on the client-side, which fundamentally violates secure authentication principles. When a user attempts to access the device's administrative interface, the authentication process relies on client-side JavaScript or application logic to verify credentials. This design flaw means that critical authentication decisions are made locally on the user's device rather than on the server where they cannot be tampered with.
An attacker with network access to the device can intercept or manipulate the client-side authentication flow to extract the login password. Since the authentication occurs client-side, the password or authentication tokens must be transmitted to or stored on the client in a manner that can be captured or reverse-engineered.
This vulnerability affects industrial environments where the CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini cameras are deployed for production line monitoring, quality control, and stoppage detection. Compromising these devices could allow attackers to conduct remote surveillance of manufacturing processes, disable recording functionality, or pivot to other systems on the industrial network.
Root Cause
The root cause of CVE-2025-24517 is the fundamental design flaw of implementing authentication verification on the client-side. Rather than transmitting credentials to a secure server endpoint for validation, the device exposes authentication material to the client where it can be intercepted or extracted. This architectural weakness means that regardless of password complexity, an attacker can bypass the authentication mechanism entirely by analyzing the client-side code or network traffic.
Attack Vector
The attack can be executed remotely over the network without requiring any prior authentication. An attacker who can reach the device's web interface can exploit this vulnerability through the following general approach:
- Access the device's web interface or API endpoint
- Analyze the client-side authentication mechanism through browser developer tools or traffic interception
- Extract the authentication password from the exposed client-side logic or network responses
- Use the obtained credentials to gain full administrative access to the camera system
Since no code examples from verified sources are available, organizations should refer to the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-084-04 and the JVN Vulnerability Report for detailed technical information about the vulnerability mechanism and exploitation techniques.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-24517
Indicators of Compromise
- Unauthorized access attempts to CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini web interfaces from unexpected IP addresses
- Anomalous network traffic patterns to/from IB-MCT001 devices on the network
- Multiple authentication requests or credential extraction attempts from external sources
- Evidence of administrative configuration changes without corresponding authorized user activity
Detection Strategies
- Monitor network traffic to CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini devices for unusual access patterns or credential harvesting attempts
- Implement network segmentation monitoring to detect unauthorized connections to ICS camera systems
- Deploy intrusion detection system (IDS) rules to identify authentication bypass attempts targeting industrial camera devices
- Audit access logs for the device web interfaces and correlate with authorized user activity
Monitoring Recommendations
- Implement continuous network monitoring for all ICS/OT camera devices including the CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini
- Enable logging on network firewalls and boundary devices to capture connection attempts to vulnerable camera systems
- Deploy SentinelOne Singularity for network visibility to detect anomalous access patterns to industrial devices
- Establish baseline traffic patterns for production line camera communications to identify deviations
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-24517
Immediate Actions Required
- Isolate CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini (IB-MCT001) devices from untrusted networks immediately
- Place affected devices behind firewalls with strict access control lists limiting access to authorized management systems only
- Disable remote access to affected cameras from the internet and restrict to internal management networks
- Review access logs for signs of prior exploitation and credential compromise
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no vendor patch is available to remediate this vulnerability. According to the Inaba ChocoMini Vulnerability Report, the vulnerability affects all versions of the CHOCO TEI WATCHER mini (IB-MCT001). Organizations should monitor vendor communications for firmware updates that address this authentication flaw.
The CISA ICS Advisory provides official guidance on protective measures until a patch becomes available. The Nozomi Networks research blog provides additional context on the vulnerability impact.
Workarounds
- Deploy network segmentation to isolate affected cameras from general network traffic and restrict access to dedicated management VLANs
- Implement VPN or secure tunneling for any remote access requirements to camera management interfaces
- Use firewall rules to limit access to the camera web interface to specific authorized IP addresses only
- Consider deploying a network access control (NAC) solution to enforce device authentication before network access is granted
- Monitor for vendor security bulletins and apply firmware updates as soon as they become available
# Network isolation example - restrict camera access to management subnet only
# Example iptables rules for Linux-based firewall/router
# Block all direct access to camera device from untrusted networks
iptables -A FORWARD -d 192.168.100.10 -j DROP
# Allow access only from authorized management subnet
iptables -I FORWARD -s 10.0.50.0/24 -d 192.168.100.10 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -I FORWARD -s 10.0.50.0/24 -d 192.168.100.10 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
# Log unauthorized access attempts for monitoring
iptables -A FORWARD -d 192.168.100.10 -j LOG --log-prefix "CHOCO-CAM-BLOCKED: "
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.


