CVE-2025-13293: TBEA TLogger Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2025-13293 Overview

CVE-2025-13293 is a hard-coded credential vulnerability [CWE-798] in TBEA TLogger version V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0. The device ships with a default root account whose password hash is stored in /etc/shadow. An unauthenticated remote attacker who recovers and cracks that hash can authenticate to the exposed SSH service and gain root-level shell access. Successful exploitation yields full administrative control of the affected device, including the ability to read, modify, or destroy any data and pivot into the surrounding network.

Critical Impact
Remote, unauthenticated attackers can obtain root SSH access to TBEA TLogger devices by using a hard-coded credential, resulting in complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Affected Products

TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0
Deployments exposing the device SSH service to untrusted networks
Industrial and energy environments using TBEA data-logging hardware

Discovery Timeline

2026-08-10 - CVE-2025-13293 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2026-08-12 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-13293

Vulnerability Analysis

The TBEA TLogger firmware embeds a static root account credential during manufacturing. The password hash resides in /etc/shadow on the device filesystem and is identical across units running the affected firmware build. Because the SSH daemon accepts password authentication for root, any attacker who can reach the device on the network and possess the recovered password can log in interactively.

Recovery of the password requires access to a single device firmware image or filesystem dump. Once an analyst extracts /etc/shadow and cracks the hash, the resulting cleartext password unlocks every deployed unit that shares the same firmware. The credential cannot be changed through normal administrative workflows without vendor intervention, so the exposure persists for the lifetime of the affected build.

This class of weakness is tracked as CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. The EPSS score at publication is 0.371% (percentile 30.103), reflecting limited observed exploitation activity but not diminishing the technical exposure.

Root Cause

The vendor provisioned a shared root password during firmware image assembly and did not require the operator to rotate or set a device-unique password on first boot. The credential is baked into the shipped /etc/shadow file and reused across the product line.

Attack Vector

Exploitation proceeds in two phases. In the preparatory phase, an attacker obtains a firmware image or a single device, extracts /etc/shadow, and cracks the root password hash offline using tools such as hashcat or john. In the exploitation phase, the attacker connects to the target device over the network on TCP port 22 and authenticates as root using the recovered password. No user interaction on the target is required.

// No verified public exploit code is available for CVE-2025-13293.
// Refer to the vendor for firmware details and remediation guidance:
// https://en.tbea.com/about.html

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-13293

Indicators of Compromise

Successful SSH authentications as root from external or unexpected internal source addresses
New SSH sessions to TLogger devices outside of documented maintenance windows
Modifications to /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, authorized_keys, or /root/.ssh/ on the device
Outbound connections from the TLogger device to attacker-controlled infrastructure

Detection Strategies

Inspect device authentication logs for repeated root logins from previously unseen IP addresses
Deploy network sensors that flag SSH sessions to TLogger management interfaces from outside authorized subnets
Baseline expected administrative source IPs and alert on deviations

Monitoring Recommendations

Forward SSH and syslog data from TLogger devices to a centralized SIEM for correlation
Monitor for configuration drift such as new cron jobs, systemd units, or SSH keys on affected devices
Track egress traffic volume from TLogger devices to identify data exfiltration attempts

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-13293

Immediate Actions Required

Remove the TLogger SSH service from any network reachable by untrusted hosts and place the device behind a firewall that restricts port 22 to a management VLAN
Contact TBEA to obtain a firmware update or vendor-supported procedure to change the root credential
Review authentication logs on all TLogger devices for prior unauthorized root logins
Rotate any secrets, keys, or certificates that may have been accessible from a compromised device

Patch Information

No public vendor advisory or fixed firmware version is referenced in the CVE record at this time. Operators should contact TBEA directly through the TBEA company site to request a firmware build that eliminates the hard-coded credential and to confirm supported remediation steps.

Workarounds

Block inbound TCP 22 to TLogger devices at the perimeter and permit SSH only from a dedicated management jump host
Where the device permits it, disable SSH password authentication and require key-based authentication, then remove the default root key material
Segment TLogger devices onto an isolated OT VLAN with strict access control lists
Monitor the device with an IDS ruleset that alerts on any SSH connection attempt from non-management sources

bash

# Example iptables restriction: allow SSH only from the management host 10.10.0.5
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -s 10.10.0.5 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j DROP