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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2025-12793

CVE-2025-12793: Asus MyASUS RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2025-12793 is an RCE vulnerability in Asus MyASUS caused by uncontrolled DLL loading in AsusSoftwareManagerAgent. Attackers can execute arbitrary code by loading malicious DLLs. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Updated:

CVE-2025-12793 Overview

CVE-2025-12793 is an uncontrolled DLL loading path vulnerability in the AsusSoftwareManagerAgent component of MyASUS. A local attacker with low privileges can influence the application to load a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) from an attacker-controlled location. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution in the context of the vulnerable process. The weakness is tracked under CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path and affects both x64 and arm64 builds of MyASUS. ASUS has published remediation guidance in the MyASUS section of the ASUS Security Advisory.

Critical Impact

A local, low-privileged attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution by planting a malicious DLL in a search path used by AsusSoftwareManagerAgent, with full impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Affected Products

  • MyASUS for x64 (versions prior to the fixed release listed in the ASUS advisory)
  • MyASUS for arm64 (versions prior to the fixed release listed in the ASUS advisory)
  • AsusSoftwareManagerAgent component bundled with MyASUS

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-01-06 - CVE-2025-12793 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in the NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-12793

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in AsusSoftwareManagerAgent, a helper component distributed with MyASUS. The process resolves at least one DLL dependency using an insecure search order. When the agent runs, Windows walks the standard library search sequence and can load a DLL from a directory that a local user can write to. Because the agent typically executes with elevated or system-level rights, loaded code inherits those privileges. This transforms an ordinary code-loading behavior into a local privilege and code execution primitive.

Root Cause

The root cause is an uncontrolled search path element, classified as CWE-426. The application does not pin DLL loads to a trusted absolute path and does not restrict the search order using SetDefaultDllDirectories, LoadLibraryEx with LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32, or similar hardening flags. As a result, a DLL placed earlier in the search order supersedes the intended system or application binary.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access and low privileges. An attacker drops a crafted DLL whose export table matches the function names expected by AsusSoftwareManagerAgent into a directory that appears in the effective search path before the legitimate module. When the agent starts or triggers the vulnerable load, the malicious library is mapped into the process. The DllMain routine or an exported function then executes attacker-controlled code inside the trusted process context. No user interaction is required beyond the normal invocation of the MyASUS service.

No public proof-of-concept is available at the time of publication, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Technical details are described in prose because no verified exploit code has been released.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2025-12793

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unsigned or unexpectedly signed DLLs present in directories adjacent to AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.exe or in per-user writable paths on the DLL search order.
  • New DLL files created by non-administrative users in application working directories immediately before AsusSoftwareManagerAgent process start.
  • Unusual child processes, network connections, or file writes originating from AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.exe.

Detection Strategies

  • Hunt for module loads by AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.exe where the loaded DLL path is outside of Program Files, System32, or the signed installation directory.
  • Correlate Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to identify DLLs written by low-privilege users and then loaded by the agent.
  • Flag processes spawned by AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.exe that execute LOLBins such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable PowerShell script block logging and Sysmon on endpoints running MyASUS to capture post-exploitation activity.
  • Alert on any modification to files whose names match known dependencies of AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.
  • Continuously inventory MyASUS versions across the fleet and compare against the fixed version published in the ASUS advisory.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-12793

Immediate Actions Required

  • Update MyASUS to the fixed release listed in the ASUS Security Advisory on all x64 and arm64 endpoints.
  • Restrict write permissions on the MyASUS installation directory and any directory that appears in the agent's DLL search order.
  • Audit endpoints for unsigned DLLs sitting alongside AsusSoftwareManagerAgent.exe and quarantine any suspicious files.

Patch Information

ASUS has released a security update for MyASUS that addresses the uncontrolled DLL loading path. Refer to the "Security Update for MyASUS" section of the ASUS Security Advisory for exact fixed versions and download links. Apply the update through the MyASUS auto-update mechanism or the Microsoft Store distribution channel.

Workarounds

  • Remove or disable MyASUS on systems where the application is not required until the patched version is deployed.
  • Enforce application allowlisting (for example, Windows Defender Application Control or AppLocker) to block execution of unsigned DLLs from user-writable locations.
  • Apply least-privilege principles so that standard users cannot write to directories inspected by the vulnerable DLL search order.
bash
# Example AppLocker rule (PowerShell) to block DLL loads from user-writable paths
New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Path -User Everyone -Action Deny \
  -Path "%OSDRIVE%\Users\*\AppData\*\*.dll" -RuleNamePrefix "Block-UserDLL"

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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