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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2025-0870: Axiosys Bento4 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

CVE-2025-0870 is a critical heap-based buffer overflow in Axiosys Bento4 affecting the AP4_DataBuffer::GetData function. Attackers can exploit this remotely to compromise systems. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact analysis, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

CVE-2025-0870 Overview

CVE-2025-0870 is a heap-based buffer overflow in Axiomatic Systems Bento4, an open-source toolkit for MP4 and DASH/HLS/CMAF media processing. The flaw resides in the AP4_DataBuffer::GetData function within Ap4DataBuffer.h. Attackers can trigger the overflow remotely by supplying a crafted media file processed by an application linked against the vulnerable library. Bento4 uses a rolling release model, so affected and fixed versions are not enumerated beyond the reported build up to 1.6.0-641. The exploit has been publicly disclosed, though successful exploitation is considered difficult due to high attack complexity.

Critical Impact

A remote attacker can corrupt heap memory through the AP4_DataBuffer::GetData code path, potentially leading to limited confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact on any application embedding Bento4.

Affected Products

  • Axiomatic Systems Bento4 up to 1.6.0-641
  • Applications and services embedding the Bento4 library for MP4/media parsing
  • Downstream tools shipping the vulnerable Ap4DataBuffer.h implementation

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-01-30 - CVE-2025-0870 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-0870

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow classified under [CWE-119] (Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer) and [CWE-787] (Out-of-bounds Write). It affects AP4_DataBuffer::GetData, a helper used across Bento4 to expose an internal heap-allocated byte buffer to callers that parse MP4 atoms and stream fragments. When a malformed media file drives the parser to request data based on attacker-controlled length fields, operations relying on the returned pointer can read or write beyond the allocated region.

Because Bento4 is a library, the impact depends on the host application. Command-line utilities such as mp4dump, mp4info, mp4edit, and any server-side transcoder or DRM packager that ingests untrusted MP4 content inherit the exposure. Public disclosure references include the upstream tracker entry and a proof-of-concept archive. See the GitHub Issue #980 and the attached reproducer archive for reproduction material.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing or insufficient bounds validation between the length field encoded in the parsed MP4 structure and the size of the heap buffer managed by AP4_DataBuffer. When downstream code trusts the size returned by GetData without cross-checking it against the allocation, it performs an out-of-bounds write on the heap.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an attacker to deliver a crafted MP4 or fragmented media file to a target that parses it with Bento4. Delivery mechanisms include file uploads to media processing pipelines, HTTP-based media ingestion, or transcoding services that accept user-submitted content. No authentication or user interaction is required, but the attack complexity is high because heap layout and allocator behavior must be aligned for reliable exploitation.

No verified public exploitation code beyond the reproducer archive is currently available. The vulnerability mechanism is described in prose only; refer to the upstream issue tracker for technical reproduction details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-0870

Indicators of Compromise

  • Crashes, aborts, or AddressSanitizer heap-buffer-overflow reports originating from AP4_DataBuffer::GetData or callers in Ap4DataBuffer.h
  • Malformed MP4 files with atom size fields that do not match declared payload lengths landing in media processing directories
  • Unexpected child processes spawned by mp4dump, mp4info, mp4edit, or embedding transcoders after ingesting external media

Detection Strategies

  • Run Bento4 binaries under AddressSanitizer or a fuzzing harness against inbound media samples to surface heap corruption early
  • Monitor process telemetry for abnormal termination signals (SIGSEGV, SIGABRT) from processes that link against libap4
  • Apply file-format validation at the ingress boundary and reject MP4 files whose atom lengths exceed the container size

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable endpoint behavioral monitoring on media transcoding and DRM packaging hosts to catch post-crash exploitation attempts
  • Centralize application crash logs and correlate them with recently uploaded media artifacts
  • Track invocations of Bento4 command-line utilities on unexpected file paths or by non-service accounts

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-0870

Immediate Actions Required

  • Inventory systems and containers that ship Bento4 or embed Ap4DataBuffer.h, including third-party media pipelines
  • Restrict Bento4 usage to trusted input, and sandbox parsing processes with reduced privileges, seccomp, or containerization
  • Track the upstream Bento4 repository for commits addressing issue #980 and rebuild once a fix lands

Patch Information

Bento4 follows a rolling release model, so no fixed version number is published in the CVE record. Rebuild against the latest commit on the main branch after upstream merges a bounds check for AP4_DataBuffer::GetData, and verify that the reproducer from the GitHub issue tracker no longer triggers a heap overflow.

Workarounds

  • Reject or pre-validate MP4 files at ingress using a hardened parser or schema check before handing content to Bento4
  • Execute Bento4 utilities inside a restricted container with no network egress and read-only filesystem mounts
  • Limit file size and complexity accepted by media processing services to reduce the surface reachable by the vulnerable code path
bash
# Configuration example: sandbox mp4dump using firejail with restricted capabilities
firejail \
  --net=none \
  --caps.drop=all \
  --nonewprivs \
  --seccomp \
  --read-only=/usr \
  --private-tmp \
  /usr/local/bin/mp4dump /input/untrusted.mp4

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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