CVE-2025-0617 Overview
CVE-2025-0617 is a denial of service vulnerability affecting Trellix HX version 10.0.0 and earlier. An attacker with access to the HX console can send specially-crafted data that triggers file parsing containing exponential entity expansions in the consumer process. The resulting resource exhaustion produces a denial of service condition on the affected host.
The vulnerability is classified under CWE-776 (Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs, commonly known as "Billion Laughs"). The flaw impacts availability only, with no confidentiality or integrity consequences.
Critical Impact
A network-based attacker can exhaust host resources on Trellix HX 10.0.0 and prior versions, disrupting endpoint detection and response operations.
Affected Products
- Trellix HX 10.0.0
- Trellix HX versions prior to 10.0.0
- Trellix HX console component processing detection data
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-01-29 - CVE-2025-0617 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-0617
Vulnerability Analysis
CVE-2025-0617 stems from unrestricted XML entity expansion during file parsing on the Trellix HX console. When the consumer process ingests a malicious detection payload, the XML parser recursively resolves nested entity references. Each layer multiplies the expansion, producing exponential memory and CPU consumption.
The attack pattern matches the classic "Billion Laughs" denial of service technique. A small input file, often only a few kilobytes, expands to gigabytes of resolved content when processed. The parser blocks the consumer process until resources are exhausted or the operating system terminates the process.
Successful exploitation degrades or halts endpoint detection and response functionality on the HX appliance. The high attack complexity reflects the need for the attacker to reach the console and craft input the consumer process will parse.
Root Cause
The parser used by the HX consumer process does not enforce entity expansion limits. XML processors must cap recursion depth, total expansion size, or disable document type definition (DTD) processing entirely to prevent this class of flaw. The affected component performs none of these checks before resolving nested entities.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the HX console interface that accepts detection data. The attacker submits a crafted file containing a chain of nested XML entities. The consumer process parses the input, triggers exponential expansion, and consumes host memory or CPU until service degradation occurs. See the Trellix advisory for vendor-specific technical detail.
No authentication or user interaction is required, though the attacker must be positioned to deliver the malicious detection payload to the console.
Detection Methods for CVE-2025-0617
Indicators of Compromise
- Sudden spikes in memory or CPU utilization on the HX console process during file parsing operations
- HX consumer process crashes, restarts, or unresponsiveness following inbound detection submissions
- XML payloads submitted to the console containing nested ENTITY declarations or recursive entity references
- Unusual growth in log files or temporary buffers correlating with parser activity
Detection Strategies
- Inspect XML content sent to the HX console for DTD declarations and recursive ENTITY references before it reaches the parser
- Monitor resource utilization baselines for the HX consumer process and alert on sustained anomalies
- Correlate console availability outages with recent inbound detection traffic to identify malicious submissions
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging on the HX console to capture parser errors, timeouts, and abnormal termination events
- Track network connections to the HX console interface and flag unauthorized sources
- Set alerting thresholds for consumer process memory growth exceeding normal operating ranges
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-0617
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Trellix HX to a version later than 10.0.0 that includes the vendor fix
- Restrict network access to the HX console to trusted management sources only
- Review inbound detection submission channels and require authenticated, validated sources
- Monitor the HX consumer process for signs of resource exhaustion until patching is complete
Patch Information
Trellix has published guidance in the Trellix knowledge base article 000014214. Administrators should consult the vendor advisory for the fixed release, upgrade instructions, and any interim configuration guidance specific to their HX deployment.
Workarounds
- Place the HX console behind network segmentation controls that limit exposure to trusted operators
- Filter inbound XML payloads at an upstream proxy or web application firewall to block DTD and recursive entity constructs
- Rate-limit detection submission endpoints to reduce the impact of malicious input while patching
# Example: restrict access to the HX console interface with iptables
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s <trusted-management-subnet> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

