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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2025-0131: GlobalProtect Privilege Escalation Flaw

CVE-2025-0131 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app for Windows that enables local users to gain SYSTEM privileges. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Updated:

CVE-2025-0131 Overview

CVE-2025-0131 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the OPSWAT MetaDefender Endpoint Security SDK. The SDK is bundled with the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app on Windows. A locally authenticated, non-administrative user can escalate to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM by exploiting incorrect privilege management [CWE-266]. Successful exploitation also requires winning a race condition, which raises the practical bar for attackers. The issue is tracked under CVSS 4.0 with a base score of 7.1 and requires local access with low privileges.

Critical Impact

A standard Windows user who wins the race condition gains SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the affected GlobalProtect Windows client.

Affected Products

  • Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app for Windows
  • OPSWAT MetaDefender Endpoint Security SDK (embedded component)
  • Windows endpoints running the vulnerable GlobalProtect client

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-05-14 - CVE-2025-0131 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-0131

Vulnerability Analysis

The defect lives in the OPSWAT MetaDefender Endpoint Security SDK, which the GlobalProtect Windows agent embeds to perform host information profile (HIP) checks. The SDK executes privileged operations in a context accessible to non-administrative users. This mismatch between the privilege of the operation and the privilege of the caller is the core of the incorrect privilege management flaw classified as [CWE-266].

Exploitation is not a simple direct call. The attacker must interleave actions with a privileged operation to substitute attacker-controlled input at the exact moment the SDK acts. Winning that window yields code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Reliable exploitation therefore depends on timing primitives, oplock tricks, or filesystem redirections that increase the odds of hitting the race window.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper separation of privileges within the SDK's endpoint check workflow. Operations that should run in a hardened, isolated context can be influenced by an unprivileged user. When combined with a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) window, the SDK acts on attacker-supplied state after a privileged security decision has been made.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local. An attacker needs valid credentials for a standard Windows account on the target machine. No user interaction and no network access are required. Successful exploitation impacts integrity of the vulnerable component and cascades to the surrounding system, allowing installation of persistent tooling, credential theft, and disabling of security agents once SYSTEM privileges are obtained.

No verified public exploit code or proof-of-concept is available at the time of writing. Refer to the Palo Alto Networks CVE-2025-0131 advisory and the OPSWAT Release Notes for CVE-2025-0131 for vendor-supplied technical detail.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-0131

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected child processes spawned by GlobalProtect or OPSWAT MetaDefender SDK components running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
  • Anomalous file creation, renaming, or symbolic link activity in directories used by the GlobalProtect agent and MetaDefender SDK during HIP checks.
  • Newly created local accounts, scheduled tasks, or services immediately following GlobalProtect process activity from a standard user session.

Detection Strategies

  • Hunt for process lineage where a SYSTEM-level process is launched from a directory writable by a non-administrative user.
  • Alert on non-administrative users triggering privileged file operations in GlobalProtect or MetaDefender SDK paths, especially those exhibiting rapid open/close/rename patterns consistent with race-condition exploitation.
  • Correlate GlobalProtect agent activity with subsequent privilege changes, token duplication events, or lsass access from unusual callers.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable Windows process creation auditing (Event ID 4688) with command line logging on all endpoints running GlobalProtect.
  • Forward Sysmon events for process creation, file creation, and image loads to a centralized data lake for retrospective hunting.
  • Track version inventory of the GlobalProtect app and flag any host still running versions listed as vulnerable in the Palo Alto Networks advisory.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-0131

Immediate Actions Required

  • Identify all Windows endpoints running the GlobalProtect app and confirm the version against the Palo Alto Networks advisory.
  • Upgrade to the fixed GlobalProtect release that ships an updated OPSWAT MetaDefender Endpoint Security SDK as documented by Palo Alto Networks and OPSWAT.
  • Restrict interactive logon rights on high-value Windows hosts to reduce the pool of accounts that could stage a local exploit.

Patch Information

Palo Alto Networks has published fixed versions of the GlobalProtect Windows client that incorporate the corrected OPSWAT MetaDefender Endpoint Security SDK. Consult the Palo Alto Networks security advisory for CVE-2025-0131 and the OPSWAT release notes for CVE-2025-0131 for the specific fixed versions and upgrade guidance.

Workarounds

  • Where immediate patching is not possible, tightly restrict local user accounts on affected endpoints and enforce least privilege for interactive sessions.
  • Apply application control policies to prevent unauthorized binaries from executing in user-writable locations that could be leveraged during the race condition.
  • Monitor endpoints continuously for the detection signals listed above until the fixed GlobalProtect version is deployed fleet-wide.
bash
# Configuration example
# Query installed GlobalProtect version on Windows endpoints via PowerShell
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Product |
  Where-Object { $_.Name -like "*GlobalProtect*" } |
  Select-Object Name, Version, Vendor

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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