CVE-2024-7557 Overview
CVE-2024-7557 is an authentication bypass and privilege escalation vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift AI (formerly OpenShift Data Science). When users deploy AI models through the platform, the UI offers an option to protect model endpoints with authentication. However, credentials issued to one model can access other models and APIs within the same namespace. The exposed ServiceAccount tokens are visible in the UI and can be used with oc --token={token} to leverage elevated view privileges tied to the ServiceAccount. This grants unauthorized access to additional cluster resources within the namespace boundary.
Critical Impact
An authenticated attacker with access to one deployed model can pivot to other models and Kubernetes API resources within the same namespace, compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability of AI workloads.
Affected Products
- Red Hat OpenShift AI
- Red Hat OpenShift Data Science
- Deployments using the Open Data Hub (ODH) Dashboard component
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-08-12 - CVE-2024-7557 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-7557
Vulnerability Analysis
CVE-2024-7557 stems from improper scoping of authentication credentials in OpenShift AI model serving. The platform issues ServiceAccount tokens to authenticate requests to protected model endpoints. These tokens carry namespace-scoped view privileges rather than being bound to a single model resource. As a result, a token intended to authorize access to Model A can be replayed against Model B or against the Kubernetes API itself using oc --token={token}.
The issue maps to [CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness], reflecting the fact that authentication succeeds but does not enforce per-resource authorization. The UI further exposes the ServiceAccount bearer tokens directly to users, making lateral access trivial once any user obtains credentials for one model.
Root Cause
The underlying defect is a lack of per-model authorization boundaries. The ODH Dashboard provisions a shared ServiceAccount with view role bindings at the namespace scope. Authentication proxies validate that the token is signed and active but do not check whether the token was intended for the specific model endpoint being accessed. See GitHub PR #3198 for ODH Dashboard for remediation details.
Attack Vector
An attacker with low-privilege access to any authenticated model endpoint in a namespace can extract the ServiceAccount token exposed by the UI. Using the standard OpenShift CLI with oc --token={token}, the attacker submits inference requests against sibling model routes or queries the Kubernetes API for resources visible to the view role. This includes ConfigMaps, Secrets referenced by view-permitted objects, running pods, and additional deployed models. No user interaction is required beyond obtaining the initial token.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-7557
Indicators of Compromise
- Requests to model inference endpoints using bearer tokens issued for a different model in the same namespace.
- Unexpected oc or kubectl API calls originating from workloads or clients using OpenShift AI ServiceAccount tokens.
- Access logs showing a single token authenticating against multiple distinct model routes within a short window.
Detection Strategies
- Audit Kubernetes API server logs for ServiceAccount tokens issued to OpenShift AI models being used against unrelated resources.
- Correlate model inference gateway logs with token identifiers to detect cross-model reuse patterns.
- Review ODH Dashboard sessions that reveal ServiceAccount tokens and track downstream use of those tokens.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Kubernetes audit logging at RequestResponse level for namespaces hosting OpenShift AI workloads.
- Alert on TokenReview events where the requesting user agent is not the expected model-serving proxy.
- Baseline normal per-model token usage and flag deviations, such as one token accessing multiple model paths.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-7557
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the Red Hat fix referenced in the Red Hat CVE-2024-7557 Advisory as soon as it is available for your OpenShift AI channel.
- Rotate all ServiceAccount tokens associated with deployed models to invalidate any tokens previously exposed through the UI.
- Isolate sensitive AI models into dedicated namespaces to constrain the blast radius of namespace-scoped token reuse.
Patch Information
Red Hat has tracked the issue under Red Hat Bug Report #2303094 and remediated the exposure through GitHub PR #3198 for ODH Dashboard. Refer to the Red Hat CVE-2024-7557 Advisory for supported product versions and errata channels.
Workarounds
- Deploy each protected model in its own namespace so ServiceAccountview privileges cannot reach sibling models.
- Replace shared ServiceAccount tokens with per-model tokens bound to narrowly scoped Role and RoleBinding objects.
- Restrict UI access to ServiceAccount tokens to cluster administrators only, using OpenShift RBAC on the ODH Dashboard.
- Front model endpoints with an external identity-aware proxy that validates a per-model audience claim before forwarding requests.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
