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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2024-6207: Rockwell ControlLogix 5580 DoS Vulnerability

CVE-2024-6207 is a denial of service vulnerability in Rockwell ControlLogix 5580 Firmware allowing attackers to prevent legitimate access via crafted CIP messages. This article covers technical details, impact, and recovery.

Published:

CVE-2024-6207 Overview

CVE-2024-6207 is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting Rockwell Automation Logix-family programmable logic controllers (PLCs). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a specially crafted Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) message to the device and disrupt legitimate access. Successful exploitation terminates connections to attached workstations and downstream devices. Recovery requires a full program download to the controller, which terminates any running process. The vulnerability is tracked under [CWE-20] Improper Input Validation and impacts industrial control system (ICS) deployments running affected ControlLogix, GuardLogix, CompactLogix, and FactoryTalk Logix Echo firmware.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated network attackers can force Logix controllers into a non-operational state, requiring a download and restart that halts any process the controller is executing.

Affected Products

  • Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 5580 and ControlLogix 5580 Process firmware
  • Rockwell Automation GuardLogix 5580, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, and Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3 firmware
  • Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5380, CompactLogix 5480, and FactoryTalk Logix Echo firmware

Discovery Timeline

  • 2024-10-14 - CVE-2024-6207 published to NVD
  • 2024-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-6207

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in how affected Logix controllers parse and handle inbound CIP messages. CIP is the application-layer protocol used by EtherNet/IP for communication between controllers, workstations, and field devices. Improper input validation of a crafted CIP message causes the controller to terminate active sessions and stop accepting new connections from legitimate engineering workstations and connected I/O. Because the controller does not recover automatically, an operator must perform a program download to restore communications. The download itself ends any active process running on the controller, producing a secondary operational impact on physical processes under control.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper validation of fields within an incoming CIP message [CWE-20]. The protocol stack accepts and processes malformed input that places the device into a state where it cannot service further requests. Rockwell Automation tracks this issue in advisory SD1707 and notes the same exploitation vector previously described in CVE-2021-22681.

Attack Vector

An attacker reaches the controller over the network on the EtherNet/IP service port and submits a specially crafted CIP packet. No authentication or user interaction is required. The attack targets only availability — confidentiality and integrity of process data are not directly affected by this flaw. In flat or insufficiently segmented operational technology (OT) networks, any compromised host with line-of-sight to the PLC can deliver the malicious payload. Refer to the Rockwell Automation Security Advisory SD1707 for protocol-level details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-6207

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected loss of communication between engineering workstations (such as Studio 5000) and Logix controllers.
  • Connected I/O devices and HMIs reporting dropped sessions to the controller without a documented change event.
  • Controller faults or non-responsive states that clear only after a program download.

Detection Strategies

  • Deploy ICS-aware network monitoring that decodes CIP and EtherNet/IP traffic and alerts on malformed CIP service codes or class identifiers.
  • Baseline normal CIP traffic patterns per controller, then alert on traffic from non-engineering hosts targeting controller TCP/44818 or UDP/2222.
  • Correlate controller connection-drop events with packet captures at the cell or zone boundary to identify the source host.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Logix controller diagnostic logs and EtherNet/IP switch port statistics to a central analytics platform for cross-referencing with network telemetry.
  • Monitor for repeated CIP ForwardOpen failures or session resets, which often precede a successful DoS attempt.
  • Alert on any new host initiating CIP sessions to a PLC outside of approved engineering and HMI assets.

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-6207

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the firmware updates referenced in Rockwell Automation advisory SD1707 to all affected ControlLogix, GuardLogix, CompactLogix, and FactoryTalk Logix Echo devices.
  • Restrict CIP/EtherNet/IP access (TCP/44818, UDP/2222) to known engineering workstations using firewall rules at the Purdue Level 3/Level 2 boundary.
  • Inventory all Logix controllers and confirm firmware revisions against the vendor's fixed-version list.

Patch Information

Rockwell Automation provides fixed firmware versions in advisory SD1707. Customers should consult the advisory for the exact patched revisions per product family and schedule a maintenance window to flash affected controllers. After patching, validate process operation before returning the controller to production.

Workarounds

  • Place Logix controllers behind an ICS-aware firewall or data diode and block CIP traffic from untrusted network segments.
  • Disable or restrict unused CIP services on the controller where the configuration allows.
  • Implement strict network segmentation between IT and OT environments, following ISA/IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit guidance.
  • Maintain offline backups of controller programs to accelerate recovery if a download is required to restore availability.
bash
# Example firewall rule: restrict CIP/EtherNet/IP to engineering hosts only
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 44818 -s 10.20.30.0/24 -d 10.50.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp --dport 2222  -s 10.20.30.0/24 -d 10.50.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 44818 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp --dport 2222  -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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