Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-58388 Overview
CVE-2024-58388 is an unauthenticated local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability affecting Sharp and Toshiba Tec rebranded multifunction printers (MFPs). The flaw resides in the installed_emanual_down.html endpoint, which fails to sanitize the path parameter. Remote attackers can supply directory traversal sequences to read arbitrary files on the printer's underlying operating system. Exposed files include /etc/passwd, coredump files containing credentials, and system configuration data. The Shadowserver Foundation first observed exploitation evidence on 2024-07-30. The weakness is tracked under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can read sensitive system files including credential-bearing coredumps, enabling follow-on compromise of the MFP and connected network resources.
Affected Products
- Sharp multifunction printers (MFPs) exposing the web management interface
- Toshiba Tec rebranded multifunction printers using the same firmware base
- Devices serving the installed_emanual_down.html endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-06-27 - Pierre Kim publishes analysis of 17 vulnerabilities affecting Sharp MFPs, including the pre-auth LFI
- 2024-07-30 - Shadowserver Foundation observes exploitation activity in the wild
- 2026-10-01 - CVE-2024-58388 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-58388
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability exists in the web-facing manual download handler (installed_emanual_down.html) exposed by the MFP's embedded HTTP server. The handler accepts a user-controlled path parameter and resolves it against the manual directory without validating or canonicalizing the input. Because no authentication is required to reach the endpoint, any network-reachable client can issue requests. Successful exploitation returns raw file contents to the attacker. Beyond direct configuration disclosure, retrieving coredump files allows adversaries to extract in-memory secrets, including stored credentials used for SMB scanning, LDAP binds, and email relay accounts.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (CWE-22). The endpoint concatenates the attacker-supplied path value into a file read operation without stripping .. sequences or enforcing a chroot-style boundary. The handler also lacks authentication checks, compounding the exposure.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only HTTP access to the printer's management interface. An attacker issues a GET request to installed_emanual_down.html with a crafted path parameter such as path=/manual/../../../etc/passwd. The traversal sequences escape the intended manual directory and resolve to arbitrary absolute paths on the device. Attackers chain this primitive to retrieve /etc/passwd, firmware configuration files, and coredumps that frequently contain plaintext credentials for upstream directory services and file shares.
For technical reproduction details, see the Pierre Kim pre-auth LFI write-up, the VulnCheck advisory, and the Nuclei detection template.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-58388
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to installed_emanual_down.html containing path= values with ../ or ..%2f sequences
- Access attempts to the endpoint from external or non-administrative IP ranges
- Printer web server responses returning non-manual content types (e.g., text/plain for /etc/passwd)
- Outbound connections from printers to attacker infrastructure following LFI probing
Detection Strategies
- Deploy the public Nuclei template crocus-lfi.yaml against printer subnets to identify vulnerable devices
- Create IDS/IPS signatures matching GET requests to installed_emanual_down.html containing directory traversal tokens
- Correlate printer HTTP access logs against expected administrator IP allowlists
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward printer web and syslog telemetry to a centralized data lake for retention and analysis
- Alert on any read access to sensitive file paths returned in printer HTTP response bodies
- Monitor for post-exploitation lateral movement from printer VLANs toward Active Directory, SMB, and SMTP services
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-58388
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict access to printer management interfaces to administrative VLANs only; block inbound HTTP/HTTPS from user networks and the internet
- Rotate any credentials known to be stored on the printer, including SMB scan accounts, LDAP bind accounts, and SMTP relay credentials
- Audit printer firmware versions and inventory all Sharp and Toshiba Tec MFPs for exposure
- Review web server logs on affected devices for prior exploitation attempts referencing installed_emanual_down.html
Patch Information
No vendor patch is referenced in the current advisory data. Consult Sharp and Toshiba Tec security advisories for firmware updates addressing the installed_emanual_down.html handler. The VulnCheck advisory tracks vendor response status.
Workarounds
- Place MFPs behind network segmentation that denies untrusted hosts access to TCP/80 and TCP/443 on the device
- Disable the embedded web management interface where operationally feasible, or bind it to a management interface only
- Use upstream reverse proxies or WAF rules to drop requests containing .. or encoded traversal sequences in the path parameter
- Remove stored credentials from the printer where functionality permits, and prefer short-lived service accounts for scan-to-share and scan-to-email
# Example firewall rule to restrict printer web management to an admin subnet
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s 10.10.50.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s 10.10.50.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

