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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2024-55540

CVE-2024-55540: Acronis Cyber Protect Privilege Escalation

CVE-2024-55540 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Acronis Cyber Protect caused by DLL hijacking. Attackers can exploit this flaw to gain elevated system privileges. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2024-55540 Overview

CVE-2024-55540 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Acronis Cyber Protect 16 for Windows. The flaw stems from insecure DLL loading behavior, categorized as [CWE-427] Uncontrolled Search Path Element. A local attacker who can place a malicious Dynamic Link Library (DLL) in a search path used by the vulnerable Acronis process can execute code in the security context of that process. Acronis addressed the issue in build 39169. The vulnerability affects Acronis Cyber Protect 16 initial release, Update 1, and Update 2 on Microsoft Windows.

Critical Impact

Successful exploitation allows a local, low-privileged user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, resulting in full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability on the affected host.

Affected Products

  • Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Windows) prior to build 39169
  • Acronis Cyber Protect 16 Update 1 and Update 2 on Windows
  • Microsoft Windows hosts running the vulnerable Acronis agent

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-01-02 - CVE-2024-55540 published to NVD
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-55540

Vulnerability Analysis

Acronis Cyber Protect 16 loads one or more DLLs without fully qualifying their paths or without validating the loaded module. When the operating system resolves the DLL name, it walks the standard Windows search order, which includes directories writable by non-privileged users in several configurations. A local attacker stages a malicious DLL in a location that is searched before the legitimate library. When the Acronis process launches, Windows loads the attacker-controlled DLL into the process address space.

Because Acronis Cyber Protect components run with elevated privileges to perform backup, recovery, and endpoint protection tasks, the injected code inherits those privileges. The result is a user-to-SYSTEM privilege escalation path on the local host. Exploitation requires some user interaction, consistent with scenarios where the user triggers execution of the vulnerable binary.

Root Cause

The root cause is an uncontrolled DLL search path in one or more executables shipped with Acronis Cyber Protect 16. The affected binaries reference dependent libraries by name rather than by absolute path, or they fail to apply hardening calls such as SetDefaultDllDirectories and LoadLibraryEx with LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32. This permits side-loading from the application directory, the current working directory, or %PATH% entries.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local. An attacker with low-privileged access to the Windows host plants a DLL with a name matching an expected but unqualified dependency. When a privileged Acronis process starts or reloads, Windows resolves the DLL through its search order and loads the malicious module. The code within DllMain executes immediately in the privileged process context. Technical specifics for the vulnerable binary and search path are described in the Acronis Security Advisory SEC-2245.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-55540

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected DLL files present in Acronis Cyber Protect installation directories or in writable path locations referenced by Acronis binaries
  • Acronis service processes loading modules from non-standard paths outside C:\Program Files\Acronis or C:\Windows\System32
  • Child processes spawned by Acronis agents that do not match normal backup, scheduler, or protection activity

Detection Strategies

  • Hunt for Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational Event ID 7 (ImageLoad) events where an Acronis process loads a DLL from a user-writable directory
  • Verify Authenticode signatures on all DLLs loaded by Acronis binaries; flag unsigned or non-Acronis signed modules
  • Alert on new file creation of DLLs with names matching Acronis module dependencies in application or working directories

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable module load logging on hosts running Acronis Cyber Protect and forward events to a centralized analytics platform
  • Baseline the set of DLLs legitimately loaded by Acronis processes and alert on deviations
  • Monitor for privilege escalation primitives correlated with Acronis process execution, including token duplication and new SYSTEM-level processes

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-55540

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Acronis Cyber Protect 16 on Windows to build 39169 or later across all managed endpoints and servers
  • Audit directories in the DLL search path of Acronis binaries and remove write permissions for standard users
  • Review endpoints for suspicious DLLs in Acronis installation paths and quarantine any unsigned modules

Patch Information

Acronis released a fixed build of Cyber Protect 16 that resolves the DLL hijacking condition. Administrators should deploy build 39169 or later as described in the Acronis Security Advisory SEC-2245. No vendor-sanctioned workaround substitutes for the patched build.

Workarounds

  • Restrict interactive and remote login on hosts running Acronis Cyber Protect to trusted administrators until patching is complete
  • Enforce least privilege on service account directories and the Acronis program directory to prevent DLL planting by standard users
  • Apply application allowlisting to block execution and loading of untrusted DLLs from user-writable locations
bash
# Example: identify world-writable directories in the system PATH on Windows (PowerShell)
$env:PATH -split ';' | ForEach-Object {
    if (Test-Path $_) {
        $acl = Get-Acl $_
        $acl.Access | Where-Object {
            $_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Everyone' -and
            $_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|Modify|FullControl'
        } | ForEach-Object {
            [PSCustomObject]@{ Path = $_; Identity = $_.IdentityReference }
        }
    }
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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