Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-45332 Overview
CVE-2024-45332 is a microarchitectural side-channel vulnerability in some Intel processors. The flaw stems from shared predictor state that influences transient execution in the indirect branch predictors. An authenticated local user can leverage this shared state to leak sensitive information across privilege boundaries. Researchers at ETH Zurich COMSEC published the issue as Branch Privilege Injection, a new class of Spectre-v2 variant that bypasses existing hardware mitigations such as Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) and Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS). Intel issued Security Advisory SA-01247, and downstream vendors including Debian have shipped microcode and kernel updates.
Critical Impact
An authenticated local attacker can read kernel memory contents, including credentials and cryptographic keys, by exploiting shared indirect branch predictor state on affected Intel CPUs.
Affected Products
- Multiple Intel processor families with indirect branch prediction (see Intel SA-01247 for the full list)
- Linux distributions shipping affected microcode, including Debian LTS
- Operating systems relying on IBPB/IBRS as a boundary between privilege domains
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-05-13 - Intel publishes Security Advisory SA-01247 and ETH Zurich COMSEC discloses Branch Privilege Injection research
- 2025-05-13 - CVE-2024-45332 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-45332
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is a transient-execution side channel in Intel's indirect branch predictors. Modern CPUs speculatively execute instructions beyond indirect branches using predicted targets stored in microarchitectural structures. These predictor structures retain state that is shared across privilege levels. An attacker who controls user-mode execution can prime the predictor so that a subsequent kernel-mode indirect branch mispredicts to an attacker-chosen gadget. The gadget runs speculatively with kernel privileges and leaves measurable traces in the CPU cache. The attacker then recovers the leaked bytes through a cache timing side channel [CWE-1303].
The ETH Zurich researchers demonstrated that race conditions in how Intel CPUs update predictor state after privilege transitions allow user-mode predictor training to persist into kernel-mode execution windows. This defeats the isolation that IBPB and eIBRS are intended to provide.
Root Cause
The root cause is a timing window between a privilege-level change and the hardware barrier that is supposed to invalidate user-controlled predictor entries. During this window, the CPU can resolve an indirect branch using training performed at a lower privilege level. The predictor is effectively shared microarchitectural state, so entries created in user mode influence speculation in kernel mode.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local, authenticated access and the ability to execute arbitrary code on the target. The attacker trains the indirect branch predictor from user space, invokes a system call that forces a privilege transition, and measures cache state to infer the speculatively accessed kernel data. Published proof-of-concept leaks /etc/shadow contents at approximately 5.6 KB/s on affected Intel processors. The attack succeeds despite enabled eIBRS and does not require ring-0 code execution.
Technical details are available in the ETHZ Branch Privilege Injection research and the Openwall OSS-Security disclosure.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-45332
Indicators of Compromise
- No reliable host-based IOCs exist because the attack leaves no artifacts in logs or on disk
- Unexpected unprivileged processes performing sustained high-frequency system calls combined with cache-timing operations
- Processes repeatedly executing clflush, rdtsc, or rdtscp sequences from user space without legitimate justification
Detection Strategies
- Monitor for userland binaries that perform tight loops of syscalls paired with timing primitives, a pattern consistent with cache side-channel measurement
- Hunt for unauthorized or unsigned executables on multi-tenant hosts where local code execution is normally restricted
- Correlate microcode version telemetry across the fleet to identify endpoints missing the Intel SA-01247 update
Monitoring Recommendations
- Collect kernel version, CPU model, and /proc/cpuinfo microcode revision from every endpoint and alert on hosts below the patched baseline
- Track performance-counter anomalies on sensitive hosts where branch misprediction rates spike alongside unprivileged workloads
- Audit which non-admin accounts can execute arbitrary native code on sensitive systems and treat such hosts as higher risk until patched
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-45332
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the Intel microcode update referenced in Intel SA-01247 to all affected systems
- Install the kernel updates distributed by your operating system vendor, including those in the Debian LTS advisory
- Reduce the local attack surface by removing unprivileged shell access from shared infrastructure wherever practical
- Prioritize patching multi-tenant hosts, developer workstations, and systems that process cryptographic material
Patch Information
Intel released microcode updates addressing CVE-2024-45332 alongside Security Advisory SA-01247 on 13 May 2025. Linux distributions including Debian have shipped corresponding kernel and intel-microcode packages. Microcode updates must be loaded by the BIOS or at early boot through the operating system to take effect. Verify the microcode revision after patching using cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep microcode on Linux hosts.
Workarounds
- Enable the kernel mitigation flags for Spectre-v2 and verify status through /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
- Disable Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) on sensitive hosts to reduce cross-thread predictor sharing where microcode updates cannot be applied immediately
- Restrict execution of untrusted native code and container workloads on systems that handle sensitive data until patches are deployed
# Verify microcode and Spectre-v2 mitigation status on Linux
grep microcode /proc/cpuinfo | head -1
cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
# Update microcode and kernel on Debian-based systems
sudo apt update
sudo apt install --only-upgrade intel-microcode linux-image-$(uname -r)
sudo reboot
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

