Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-42671 Overview
CVE-2024-42671 is a Host Header Poisoning Open Redirect vulnerability affecting slabiak Appointment Scheduler version 1.0.5. The application trusts the Host header from incoming HTTP requests when constructing URLs used in redirects or links. A remote attacker can supply a crafted Host header to redirect users to an attacker-controlled domain. Successful exploitation can facilitate phishing campaigns, credential theft, or malware distribution. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-79 and requires user interaction, typically through a crafted link.
Critical Impact
Attackers can abuse the Host header to redirect authenticated or unauthenticated users to malicious domains, enabling phishing and credential theft against users of the scheduler application.
Affected Products
- slabiak Appointment Scheduler version 1.0.5
- Earlier versions that implement the same URL construction pattern
- Deployments that do not enforce an allowlist of trusted hosts
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-01-31 - CVE-2024-42671 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-42671
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is an open redirect caused by Host header poisoning. The Appointment Scheduler application reads the HTTP Host header from incoming requests and uses it, without validation, to build absolute URLs returned to the client. These URLs appear in redirect responses, email links, and password reset flows. An attacker who sends a request with a forged Host header can cause the application to generate links pointing to an external, attacker-controlled host.
Because the redirect originates from a trusted application domain, victims see what appears to be a legitimate link. When clicked, the link forwards them to a malicious site. This pattern is commonly abused in phishing kits that mimic the legitimate login page to harvest credentials.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper trust in a client-supplied header. The application does not validate the Host header against an allowlist of expected domains before using it in URL generation. There is also no server-side configuration that pins the canonical hostname. See the GitHub issue discussion for the maintainer thread.
Attack Vector
Exploitation occurs over the network and requires user interaction. An attacker sends a request to the vulnerable scheduler with a Host header set to a malicious domain, for example by triggering a password reset or any flow that emits a link back to the user. The resulting email or response contains a link rooted at the attacker's domain. The victim clicks the link and is redirected off the trusted application into attacker-controlled infrastructure. Technical reproduction steps are documented in the public PoC repository.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-42671
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to the Appointment Scheduler containing a Host header value that does not match the deployed canonical domain
- Outbound redirect responses (3xx) with Location headers pointing to unexpected external domains
- Password reset or notification emails containing links whose hostname differs from the production domain
Detection Strategies
- Inspect web server and reverse proxy logs for Host header values that deviate from the configured canonical hostname
- Add web application firewall (WAF) rules to flag or block requests whose Host header is not in an approved allowlist
- Review outbound email templates generated by the scheduler for links with mismatched hostnames
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on anomalous Host header distributions across request logs, which indicate header fuzzing or probing
- Monitor DNS resolution and HTTP egress for suspicious lookalike domains referenced in generated links
- Track user reports of unexpected redirects originating from the scheduler application
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-42671
Immediate Actions Required
- Configure the application and any fronting reverse proxy to enforce a fixed, trusted hostname for URL generation
- Validate the incoming Host header against an allowlist and reject or normalize non-matching values
- Audit outbound links in email flows (password reset, notifications) for host mismatches and invalidate links already in transit
Patch Information
No vendor-supplied patch is referenced in the NVD entry for CVE-2024-42671. Operators of slabiak Appointment Scheduler 1.0.5 should monitor the upstream project at the GitHub issue tracker for a fix. Until a patch is published, apply the workarounds below at the application and infrastructure layer.
Workarounds
- Set a server-side configuration value for the canonical application URL and use it, not the request Host header, when generating absolute links
- Deploy a reverse proxy (nginx, HAProxy) that overwrites the Host header with the trusted domain before forwarding requests to the application
- Add a WAF rule to drop requests whose Host header is not on the allowlist of approved domains
- Enforce HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and strict TLS certificate validation to raise the cost of lookalike redirects
# Configuration example
# nginx: enforce a trusted Host header before proxying to the scheduler
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name scheduler.example.com;
if ($host != "scheduler.example.com") {
return 421;
}
location / {
proxy_set_header Host scheduler.example.com;
proxy_pass http://appointment_scheduler_backend;
}
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

