Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-42513 Overview
CVE-2024-42513 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the OPC Foundation's OPC UA .NET Standard Stack. The flaw affects versions prior to 1.5.374.158 and allows an unauthorized network attacker to bypass application authentication when HTTPS endpoints are in use. OPC UA (Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture) is a machine-to-machine communication protocol widely deployed in industrial control systems and operational technology (OT) environments. A successful attack undermines the trust model that identifies which client applications are permitted to interact with an OPC UA server over HTTPS transport.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated network attackers can bypass application-layer authentication on OPC UA HTTPS endpoints, gaining access reserved for trusted client applications in industrial environments.
Affected Products
- OPC Foundation OPC UA .NET Standard Stack versions before 1.5.374.158
- Applications and servers built on the vulnerable stack that expose HTTPS endpoints
- Industrial and OT deployments relying on OPC UA application authentication over HTTPS
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-02-10 - CVE-2024-42513 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-42513
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness]. It affects the application authentication layer of the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack when clients or servers communicate through HTTPS endpoints. OPC UA supports multiple transport bindings, including opc.tcp and opc.https. The HTTPS binding relies on Transport Layer Security (TLS) for channel protection and layers OPC UA application authentication on top. In vulnerable releases, an unauthorized attacker can circumvent that application authentication step, causing the server to treat requests as if they originated from an authenticated application.
The advisory scopes the impact to confidentiality only, with no direct effect on integrity or availability. The attack requires no privileges and no user interaction, and it can be executed remotely across the network.
Root Cause
The root cause lies in how the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack validates the application identity of peers connecting over HTTPS. When the transport layer secures the channel with TLS, the stack fails to correctly enforce the additional OPC UA application authentication check. Consult the OPC Foundation Security Bulletin CVE-2024-42513 for the vendor's technical description.
Attack Vector
An attacker who can reach an OPC UA HTTPS endpoint over the network can issue requests that would normally require a validated application identity. Because the application authentication step is bypassed, the attacker interacts with the server as an ostensibly trusted client. In OT and industrial deployments, exposure of an HTTPS endpoint to untrusted networks or across insufficiently segmented plant networks materially increases risk. No proof-of-concept exploit is publicly available at this time.
No verified exploit code is available. Refer to the OPC Foundation Security Bulletin CVE-2024-42513 for authoritative technical details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2024-42513
Indicators of Compromise
- Connections to OPC UA HTTPS endpoints from client applications or IP addresses not present in your approved OPC UA client inventory.
- OPC UA session establishment events on HTTPS transports where the application URI or certificate does not match a known, trusted client.
- Unexpected CreateSession or ActivateSession calls originating from network segments that should not reach OT endpoints.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory every host running the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack and confirm the installed assembly version against 1.5.374.158.
- Enable and centrally collect OPC UA server audit events, focusing on session creation, application authentication decisions, and certificate validation outcomes on HTTPS listeners.
- Correlate network flow telemetry with the authorized OPC UA client list to surface unexpected peers reaching HTTPS endpoints.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward OPC UA server logs and host telemetry to a centralized analytics platform for retention and query.
- Alert on new or previously unseen client certificates presented to OPC UA HTTPS endpoints.
- Monitor east-west traffic to industrial zones for OPC UA sessions crossing segmentation boundaries.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-42513
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack to version 1.5.374.158 or later on all affected servers, clients, and embedded applications.
- Rebuild and redeploy any downstream products that statically link or bundle the vulnerable stack version.
- Audit all OPC UA HTTPS endpoints exposed to enterprise or shared networks and restrict reachability to trusted client hosts only.
Patch Information
The OPC Foundation has released a fixed version of the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack that resolves the application authentication bypass. Consumers must update to version 1.5.374.158 or later. See the OPC Foundation Security Bulletin CVE-2024-42513 for release details and upgrade guidance.
Workarounds
- Disable OPC UA HTTPS endpoints where they are not required and prefer the opc.tcp binding with mutual application authentication.
- Enforce strict network segmentation so OPC UA HTTPS endpoints are unreachable from untrusted zones, using firewalls or industrial DMZs.
- Restrict access at the transport layer with TLS mutual authentication and IP allow lists that match your authorized client inventory.
# Configuration example
# Refer to the OPC Foundation Security Bulletin for authoritative upgrade guidance.
# Example: verify the installed OPC UA .NET Standard Stack assembly version on Windows
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Program Files' -Recurse -Filter 'Opc.Ua.Core.dll' |
ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{
Path = $_.FullName
Version = (Get-Item $_.FullName).VersionInfo.FileVersion
} }
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

