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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2024-40113

CVE-2024-40113: Sitecom WLX-2006 Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2024-40113 is an authentication bypass flaw in Sitecom WLX-2006 Wall Mount Range Extender that exploits default credentials, allowing unauthorized access. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2024-40113 Overview

CVE-2024-40113 affects the Sitecom WLX-2006 Wall Mount Range Extender N300 running firmware version 1.5 and earlier. The device ships with default credentials that remain active unless administrators manually change them. Attackers on the same network can authenticate to the management interface using well-known factory values and gain control of the extender.

The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-1392] Use of Default Credentials. It allows unauthorized access to device administration, exposing network traffic routed through the extender and enabling further pivoting into the local network.

Critical Impact

Network-adjacent attackers can authenticate to the WLX-2006 management interface using unchanged factory credentials, compromising confidentiality and integrity of the device and the traffic it handles.

Affected Products

  • Sitecom WLX-2006 Wall Mount Range Extender N300 (hardware)
  • Sitecom WLX-2006 firmware version 1.5
  • Sitecom WLX-2006 firmware versions prior to 1.5

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-06-02 - CVE-2024-40113 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-40113

Vulnerability Analysis

The Sitecom WLX-2006 is a consumer-grade Wi-Fi range extender that provides a web-based administration console. The device is provisioned with factory default credentials for the administrative account. These credentials are documented in the product manual and remain valid after initial setup unless an operator explicitly changes them.

An attacker reachable over the network can submit the default username and password to the login endpoint and receive an authenticated session. From there, the attacker controls wireless configuration, upstream connectivity, and any management features exposed by the firmware. The flaw does not require social engineering, exploit code, or memory corruption primitives.

Root Cause

The root cause is a configuration and design decision classified as [CWE-1392] Use of Default Credentials. The firmware does not require the user to set a unique administrative password during first-time setup, and it does not disable remote management until credentials are rotated. This leaves the authentication boundary dependent on user action that frequently never occurs.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the device's administrative interface, typically HTTP on the local wireless or wired segment. An attacker associates with the extender, browses to the management URL, and submits the factory credentials. Successful authentication grants full administrative access. The attacker can enable remote management, alter DNS settings, capture traffic, or install rogue configurations that persist across reboots.

No public proof-of-concept exploit is referenced in the NVD record, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Technical research notes are published at the GitHub CVE-2024-40113 Research repository.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2024-40113

Indicators of Compromise

  • Successful HTTP authentication to the WLX-2006 web console from unexpected client MAC addresses or IP ranges.
  • Unapproved changes to wireless SSID, encryption settings, DNS servers, or administrator password on the extender.
  • Enabling of remote management, UPnP, or WAN-side administration features that were previously disabled.

Detection Strategies

  • Inventory all Sitecom WLX-2006 devices on the network and verify firmware version against the vulnerable set (1.5 and earlier).
  • Attempt authentication against identified devices using documented factory credentials in an authorized assessment to confirm exposure.
  • Review wireless and DHCP logs for new or unknown clients associating with the extender's management VLAN.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Alert on configuration changes to embedded network devices through SNMP traps or syslog where supported.
  • Monitor outbound DNS traffic for signs of DNS hijacking that would indicate a compromised extender.
  • Track administrative HTTP sessions originating from client subnets that should not have management access.

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-40113

Immediate Actions Required

  • Change the default administrator password on every WLX-2006 device to a unique, strong value.
  • Restrict access to the management interface to a dedicated administrative VLAN or specific trusted hosts.
  • Disable any WAN-side or remote administration features that are not required for operations.
  • Segment IoT and consumer-grade network equipment from production and user workstations.

Patch Information

No vendor patch is referenced in the NVD record for CVE-2024-40113. Check firmware availability on the Sitecom Product Downloads page and apply any newer firmware the vendor publishes. If no fix is available, treat the device as end-of-life for security-sensitive deployments and plan replacement with a supported model.

Workarounds

  • Rotate credentials immediately after unboxing and after every factory reset.
  • Place the extender behind a firewall rule that blocks management traffic from untrusted subnets.
  • Disable Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) and other convenience features that may expose the device to adjacent-network attacks.
  • Replace unsupported consumer hardware with enterprise-managed access points where feasible.
bash
# Configuration example: block management access from client VLAN
# (Apply on upstream router/firewall; adjust interface and subnet to your environment)
iptables -I FORWARD -s 192.168.10.0/24 -d 192.168.1.1 -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -s 192.168.10.0/24 -d 192.168.1.1 -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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