Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-39561 Overview
CVE-2024-39561 is an Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability [CWE-754] in the flow daemon (flowd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX4600 and SRX5000 Series firewalls. The flaw allows a network-based attacker to send TCP packets with SYN/FIN or SYN/RST flag combinations and bypass the firewall's expected packet-drop behavior. When no-syn-check and Express Path are enabled, these malformed TCP packets are forwarded unexpectedly to the downstream network. Juniper published the issue in advisory JSA83021 on July 10, 2024.
Critical Impact
Attackers can smuggle malformed TCP packets through affected SRX firewalls, undermining perimeter filtering and enabling downstream reconnaissance or evasion of network defenses.
Affected Products
- Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX4600 Series
- Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX5000 Series (SRX5400, SRX5600, SRX5800)
- Junos OS versions prior to 21.2R3-S8, 21.4R3-S7, 22.1R3-S6, 22.2R3-S4, 22.3R3-S3, 22.4R3-S2, 23.2R2, 23.4R1-S1, and 23.4R2
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-07-10 - CVE-2024-39561 published to NVD alongside Juniper Security Advisory JSA83021
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-39561
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in the flow daemon (flowd) that implements packet forwarding and inspection on SRX4600 and SRX5000 Series platforms. Under normal operation, flowd identifies TCP packets with illegal flag combinations such as SYN/FIN or SYN/RST and drops them because they violate the TCP state machine. These flag combinations are commonly associated with stack fingerprinting, firewall evasion, and intrusion detection system (IDS) bypass techniques.
The vulnerability manifests only when two specific features interact: no-syn-check (which disables TCP SYN checking for asymmetric routing or session pickup scenarios) and Express Path (a fast-path forwarding mechanism that offloads flow processing). With this combination enabled, flowd fails to apply the illegal-flag check to packets taking the Express Path, forwarding them to the downstream network instead.
Root Cause
The root cause is an improper check for an exceptional condition in the Express Path code path. The validation logic that drops TCP packets with mutually exclusive flag combinations is bypassed when no-syn-check disables SYN-centric state validation. The Express Path fast-forwarding logic does not independently reapply the illegal-flag filter, leaving a gap in packet sanitization.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated attacker on the network sends crafted TCP packets with SYN+FIN or SYN+RST flags set simultaneously, destined to pass through the affected SRX firewall. No authentication, user interaction, or privileged access to the device is required. Because the packets traverse the firewall rather than terminating on it, the attacker can use the device as an unintended conduit to perform OS fingerprinting, probe downstream hosts, or evade security controls that expect such packets to be dropped at the perimeter. No public proof-of-concept exploit has been published for this issue.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-39561
Indicators of Compromise
- Observation of TCP packets with simultaneous SYN+FIN or SYN+RST flag combinations egressing an SRX4600 or SRX5000 Series firewall interface
- Downstream IDS or NDR alerts for illegal TCP flag combinations originating from traffic that transited an SRX firewall
- Unexpected session or flow entries in flowd for TCP connections that should have been blocked by stateful inspection
Detection Strategies
- Inspect running configuration for the combination of set security flow tcp-session no-syn-check (or per-policy equivalents) and services-offload or Express Path enablement on affected SRX platforms
- Deploy network sensors downstream of SRX firewalls to flag TCP packets with mutually exclusive flag bits, which should never legitimately appear in production traffic
- Correlate firewall flow logs with downstream packet captures to identify traffic that bypassed expected drop actions
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable flow session logging on SRX4600 and SRX5000 devices and forward logs to a centralized SIEM for anomaly review
- Baseline TCP flag distributions on egress interfaces and alert on deviations consistent with SYN/FIN or SYN/RST patterns
- Review Juniper Networks Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) advisories regularly for related flowd disclosures
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-39561
Immediate Actions Required
- Identify SRX4600 and SRX5000 Series devices running vulnerable Junos OS versions and prioritize them for upgrade
- Audit security policy configurations for simultaneous use of no-syn-check and Express Path, which is the required precondition for exploitation
- Review the official Juniper Security Advisory JSA83021 for vendor-specific guidance
Patch Information
Juniper Networks has released fixed software in Junos OS 21.2R3-S8, 21.4R3-S7, 22.1R3-S6, 22.2R3-S4, 22.3R3-S3, 22.4R3-S2, 23.2R2, 23.4R1-S1, 23.4R2, and all subsequent releases. Administrators should plan an upgrade to one of these versions or later on affected SRX4600 and SRX5000 Series platforms. Refer to Juniper Security Advisory JSA83021 for the authoritative fix matrix.
Workarounds
- Disable no-syn-check on affected security policies if operational requirements permit, which prevents the vulnerable code path from being reached
- Disable Express Path (services-offload) on affected flows, which forces packets through the full inspection pipeline that correctly drops illegal TCP flag combinations
- Deploy a downstream filtering device or IDS rule that drops TCP packets with SYN+FIN or SYN+RST flag combinations until patches are applied
# Example: disable services-offload (Express Path) on an affected policy
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy EXAMPLE-POLICY then permit
delete security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy EXAMPLE-POLICY then permit application-services services-offload
commit
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

