Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-34319 Overview
CVE-2024-34319 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in ProPhoenix Law RMS v2022.2403.3.101. The flaw resides in the serviceURL parameter, which fails to validate user-supplied URLs before issuing outbound requests. Attackers can send a crafted HTTP request that forces the application server to perform unintended DNS lookups and web requests to arbitrary destinations. The weakness is tracked under CWE-918 and affects a records management system used by law enforcement agencies.
Critical Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can abuse the application server to probe internal networks, enumerate services, and interact with resources that are otherwise unreachable from the public internet.
Affected Products
- ProPhoenix Law RMS v2022.2403.3.101
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-13 - CVE-2024-34319 published to NVD
- 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-34319
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to control the destination of server-initiated HTTP and DNS requests. The serviceURL parameter accepts user-supplied values that the backend uses directly to construct outbound requests. Because the application does not restrict schemes, hosts, or IP ranges, attackers can target internal infrastructure, cloud metadata endpoints, and services bound only to loopback interfaces.
Successful exploitation can expose internal network topology and reachable services. The confidentiality and integrity impacts are limited, but the ability to pivot through a trusted law enforcement application creates meaningful downstream risk. See the analysis by Sedric Louis Saint for broader context on vulnerabilities in the ProPhoenix Law RMS stack.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing validation of the serviceURL parameter. The application treats the value as a trusted URL and issues an outbound request on behalf of the user. No allowlist of destinations, scheme filter, or hostname/IP resolution check is applied. This matches the pattern described in CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based and does not require authentication or user interaction. An attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint with a serviceURL value pointing to an internal host, a cloud metadata service, or an attacker-controlled server. The application server resolves the hostname and issues the request, returning responses or side effects observable to the attacker. See ProPhoenix Law RMS product information for deployment context.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-34319
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP requests from the ProPhoenix application server to RFC1918 addresses, link-local ranges, or 169.254.169.254 metadata endpoints.
- DNS queries originating from the application server for domains unrelated to normal application operation.
- Repeated HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint containing varied serviceURL parameter values.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect web server and application logs for requests containing the serviceURL parameter and correlate with resulting outbound connections.
- Deploy web application firewall rules that flag serviceURL values pointing to internal address ranges or non-HTTP schemes.
- Review egress firewall logs for connections from the application server that violate expected destination patterns.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Capture DNS resolver telemetry from the ProPhoenix server and alert on queries to internal zones or external domains outside an approved list.
- Monitor outbound TCP sessions from the application host and alert on connections to private address space or cloud metadata IPs.
- Baseline normal HTTP destinations for the application and flag deviations.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-34319
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict outbound network access from the ProPhoenix Law RMS server using egress firewall rules that block RFC1918, link-local, and metadata endpoint destinations.
- Contact ProPhoenix for a patched build of Law RMS and apply it as soon as available.
- Review historical logs for suspicious serviceURL parameter values and investigate any unexpected outbound traffic.
Patch Information
No vendor patch identifier is listed in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Operators should contact ProPhoenix directly through the ProPhoenix Law RMS product page to obtain remediation guidance and a fixed version.
Workarounds
- Place the application behind a forward proxy that enforces an allowlist of permitted outbound destinations.
- Block the vulnerable endpoint at the reverse proxy or WAF layer until a vendor fix is deployed.
- Isolate the application server on a network segment with no route to sensitive internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.
# Example iptables egress rules to block SSRF pivot targets
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

