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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2024-20536

CVE-2024-20536: Cisco Nexus Dashboard SQLI Vulnerability

CVE-2024-20536 is an SQL injection flaw in Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Updated:

CVE-2024-20536 Overview

Cisco disclosed CVE-2024-20536, a SQL injection vulnerability in the REST API endpoint and web-based management interface of Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC). The flaw allows an authenticated, remote attacker with read-only privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands against the internal database of an affected device. Successful exploitation permits reading, modifying, or deleting arbitrary data and can affect device availability. The weakness is tracked as [CWE-89] (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command).

Critical Impact

A low-privileged authenticated user can perform arbitrary SQL operations against the NDFC internal database, compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability of fabric management data.

Affected Products

  • Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller 12.1.2
  • Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller 12.1.3
  • Deployments exposing the NDFC REST API or web-based management interface

Discovery Timeline

  • 2024-11-06 - CVE-2024-20536 published to NVD alongside the Cisco Security Advisory
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-20536

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in how NDFC processes user-supplied input received through a specific REST API endpoint and the web-based management interface. Input passed by an authenticated caller is incorporated into backend SQL queries without sufficient validation or parameterization. An attacker with read-only NDFC credentials can therefore alter the intended query structure and issue arbitrary SQL against the internal database.

Because NDFC centrally manages Nexus data center fabrics, the internal database holds fabric topology, device inventory, credentials references, policy configuration, and operational state. Read access exposes that data to a low-privileged user. Write access allows tampering with fabric management records, and destructive statements can disrupt controller availability.

The attacker only needs valid credentials at the lowest privilege tier and network reachability to the management interface. No user interaction is required.

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient validation of user-supplied input reaching a SQL query builder in the NDFC backend. Parameters accepted through the affected REST API endpoint and web-based management interface are concatenated into SQL statements rather than being bound as parameters, enabling classic SQL injection as classified under [CWE-89].

Attack Vector

Exploitation is performed over the network against the NDFC management plane. The attacker authenticates using any read-only NDFC account and submits a crafted HTTP request containing SQL metacharacters within a vulnerable parameter of the affected REST API endpoint or web UI action. The controller processes the tainted input, and the injected SQL fragment executes against the internal database with the privileges of the NDFC database user.

No verified public exploit code or proof-of-concept has been released for CVE-2024-20536. Cisco has not reported in-the-wild exploitation, and the CVE is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Technical specifics of the vulnerable endpoint are described in the Cisco Security Advisory.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-20536

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP requests to NDFC REST API endpoints containing SQL metacharacters such as ', --, ;, UNION, SELECT, or INFORMATION_SCHEMA from authenticated read-only sessions
  • Anomalous response sizes or HTTP 500 errors on NDFC API endpoints correlated with a single authenticated session
  • NDFC database logs showing unexpected SELECT, UPDATE, or DELETE statements outside routine controller workflows
  • Read-only NDFC accounts issuing volumes or patterns of API calls inconsistent with their operational role

Detection Strategies

  • Deploy Web Application Firewall or reverse proxy signatures in front of NDFC to inspect API request parameters for SQL injection patterns
  • Enable and centralize NDFC audit logging, application logs, and database query logs for correlation and retention
  • Baseline normal API usage per NDFC role and alert on deviations, particularly from read-only accounts touching write-capable endpoints

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward NDFC access, application, and database logs to a SIEM for query and correlation across authentication and API activity
  • Alert on repeated authentication from read-only accounts followed by unusual API endpoint enumeration
  • Monitor egress from the NDFC host for unexpected outbound connections that could indicate data exfiltration after successful injection

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-20536

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade NDFC to a fixed release as listed in the Cisco Security Advisory; versions 12.1.2 and 12.1.3 are affected
  • Restrict network access to the NDFC web-based management interface and REST API to trusted management networks and jump hosts
  • Audit NDFC user accounts and revoke unused or shared read-only credentials
  • Rotate credentials for any accounts that may have been exposed on affected controllers

Patch Information

Cisco has released fixed software for Cisco Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller. Refer to the Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ndfc-sqli-CyPPAxrL for the specific fixed release trains and upgrade guidance. No workarounds that fully address the vulnerability are provided by Cisco; upgrading is the required remediation.

Workarounds

  • No vendor-supplied workarounds fully mitigate CVE-2024-20536; upgrading is required
  • As a compensating control, tightly restrict management-plane reachability using network ACLs and enforce administrative access through bastion hosts with multi-factor authentication
  • Enforce least privilege on NDFC role assignments and remove read-only accounts that are not strictly required
bash
# Example compensating control: restrict NDFC management access at the network edge
# (replace interface, ACL name, and management subnet with values appropriate to your environment)
ip access-list extended NDFC-MGMT-ACL
 permit tcp 10.10.0.0 0.0.0.255 host <NDFC-IP> eq 443
 deny   tcp any host <NDFC-IP> eq 443 log
 permit ip any any
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip access-group NDFC-MGMT-ACL in

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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