CVE-2024-11619 Overview
CVE-2024-11619 affects the open-source e-commerce platform macrozheng/mall up to version 1.0.3. The vulnerability resides in the JWT Token Handler component, which uses a default cryptographic key [CWE-1394]. An attacker with adjacent network access can leverage the known default key to forge or tamper with JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) issued by the application. Successful exploitation can lead to limited impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The vendor was contacted but did not respond, and the original GitHub issue was deleted without explanation. Attack complexity is high, which limits practical exploitation in many deployments.
Critical Impact
Attackers on an adjacent network can forge JWTs using the shipped default signing key, potentially impersonating users of the macrozheng/mall application.
Affected Products
- macrozheng mall versions up to and including 1.0.3
- Deployments using the default JWT Token Handler configuration
- Downstream forks that retain the bundled default signing key
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-11-22 - CVE-2024-11619 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-11619
Vulnerability Analysis
The macrozheng/mall project ships a JWT Token Handler that signs authentication tokens with a hardcoded default cryptographic key. Because this key is embedded in the public source repository, any party can recover it. An attacker who obtains the key can sign arbitrary JWT payloads that the application will accept as valid. The condition is classified as Use of Default Cryptographic Key [CWE-1394]. Although the issue has high attack complexity, the impact directly undermines the authentication layer of the e-commerce platform.
Root Cause
The handler initializes its HMAC signing secret from a default constant supplied with the source distribution rather than from a per-deployment secret. Operators who deploy macrozheng/mall without overriding the secret in configuration inherit the publicly known key. This eliminates the cryptographic separation that JWT signatures are designed to provide.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires adjacent network access to a vulnerable macrozheng/mall instance. An attacker constructs a JWT containing a chosen sub, role, or expiration claim and signs it with the recovered default key. The forged token is then submitted in the Authorization: Bearer header against authenticated API endpoints. The exploit does not require user interaction or prior privileges, but the high attack complexity reflects environmental conditions needed to reach the service.
No public proof-of-concept code has been released. For component-level context, see the GitHub Issue Report and the VulDB CTI Entry #285842.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-11619
Indicators of Compromise
- Authentication events showing JWTs signed with the project's default secret value
- Unexpected privilege elevation in mall accounts without a preceding login flow
- API requests bearing valid JWTs that originate from IP ranges not associated with legitimate clients
Detection Strategies
- Audit running macrozheng/mall deployments and compare the configured JWT secret against the default value distributed in the source repository.
- Inspect application logs for token iat and exp timestamps inconsistent with normal user login patterns.
- Correlate JWT issuance events with backend session creation to identify tokens accepted without a corresponding authentication flow.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward mall application and reverse proxy logs to a centralized log platform for retention and search.
- Alert on repeated requests using JWTs with anomalous sub claims, especially administrative roles.
- Track failed and successful authorization decisions per source IP to flag adjacent-network probing.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-11619
Immediate Actions Required
- Replace the default JWT signing secret with a high-entropy, deployment-specific value stored outside the source tree.
- Invalidate all previously issued JWTs by rotating the secret and shortening token lifetimes.
- Restrict network exposure of macrozheng/mall administrative endpoints to trusted segments.
Patch Information
No vendor patch is referenced in the advisory data. The vendor did not respond to disclosure, and the upstream GitHub issue was deleted. Operators should treat configuration hardening as the primary remediation. Track the GitHub Issue Report and VulDB #285842 for updates.
Workarounds
- Override the JWT secret in application.yml (or equivalent configuration) with a randomly generated 256-bit value before deployment.
- Place the mall service behind an authenticated reverse proxy that performs an independent token check.
- Enforce short JWT expiration windows and add server-side token revocation lists to limit the window of forged-token validity.
# Configuration example: generate a strong JWT secret and inject via environment
openssl rand -base64 64 > /etc/mall/jwt.secret
chmod 600 /etc/mall/jwt.secret
export MALL_JWT_SECRET="$(cat /etc/mall/jwt.secret)"
# Reference MALL_JWT_SECRET from application.yml instead of the default value
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
