CVE-2024-11533 Overview
CVE-2024-11533 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in IrfanView, affecting the parsing of Drawing Exchange Format (DXF) files. The flaw stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied data, allowing a crafted DXF file to write past the end of an allocated buffer. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. Exploitation requires user interaction: the target must open a malicious file or visit a page delivering one. The issue was reported through the Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-24616 and is tracked as [CWE-787].
Critical Impact
Attackers can achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's system when a user opens a malicious DXF file in IrfanView.
Affected Products
- IrfanView 4.67 (x64)
- IrfanView 4.67 (x86)
- IrfanView installations with vulnerable DXF parsing components
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-11-22 - CVE-2024-11533 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
- Reported through the Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-24616, published as Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-24-1586
Technical Details for CVE-2024-11533
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in IrfanView's DXF file parser. DXF is a CAD interchange format originally introduced by Autodesk, and IrfanView parses these files to render vector content. When processing attacker-controlled fields inside a DXF file, the parser fails to validate size or index values before writing into a fixed-size buffer. The resulting out-of-bounds write [CWE-787] corrupts adjacent memory in the same process. An attacker who controls the corrupted memory can hijack control flow and execute code with the privileges of the user running i_view64.exe or i_view32.exe.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing bounds validation on user-supplied data within the DXF parsing routines. The parser trusts length or offset values embedded in the file and uses them directly to compute a destination write, without confirming that the write remains inside the allocated buffer. A crafted DXF record therefore drives a linear or offset-based write past the buffer boundary.
Attack Vector
Exploitation is local and requires user interaction. An attacker crafts a malicious DXF file and delivers it through email, a download link, or a web page. When the user opens the file in IrfanView, the parser processes attacker-controlled fields and triggers the out-of-bounds write. The attacker gains code execution in the context of the current user process, which can then be used to install malware, harvest credentials, or pivot on the host.
No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. Refer to the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-24-1586 for additional technical detail.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-11533
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected crashes of i_view32.exe or i_view64.exe immediately after opening a .dxf file
- DXF files arriving from untrusted sources such as email attachments or drive-by downloads
- Child processes spawned by IrfanView that are inconsistent with an image viewer (for example, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe)
- Unsigned or newly written executables and DLLs dropped into user-writable directories following DXF file access
Detection Strategies
- Monitor process lineage where IrfanView spawns interpreters, script hosts, or LOLBins
- Alert on IrfanView performing network connections or writing to autorun locations shortly after file open events
- Inspect Windows Error Reporting and application crash telemetry for faulting modules within IrfanView's DXF handling code
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enrich endpoint telemetry with file-type context so DXF opens by IrfanView can be correlated with subsequent process activity
- Track distribution of DXF files across mail, web, and file-share vectors in your organization
- Correlate crashes of IrfanView with follow-on process creation, module loads, and outbound network traffic on the same host
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-11533
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory endpoints running IrfanView 4.67 (x86 and x64) and prioritize systems that regularly handle files from external sources
- Restrict opening of DXF files in IrfanView until a fixed version is deployed by associating .dxf with a hardened viewer or blocking the extension at the mail gateway
- Educate users to avoid opening unsolicited DXF attachments and links, since exploitation requires user interaction
Patch Information
The vendor has not published a dedicated advisory URL in the enriched data. Consult the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-24-1586 for coordination status and upgrade to the latest IrfanView release from the official vendor site once a fixed version supersedes 4.67.
Workarounds
- Remove the DXF file association from IrfanView so the vulnerable parser is not invoked on double-click
- Block or quarantine inbound .dxf attachments at the email gateway and web proxy where CAD workflows are not required
- Run IrfanView under a standard user account with Windows Defender Exploit Protection enabled to reduce the impact of successful code execution
# Configuration example: remove the DXF association for IrfanView on Windows
# Run in an elevated PowerShell session
Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\.dxf' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\IrfanView.dxf' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Optionally block the extension at the mail gateway or via AppLocker file rules
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
