CVE-2019-25718: Dräger Infinity Explorer C700 Vulnerability

CVE-2019-25718 Overview

CVE-2019-25718 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Dräger Infinity Explorer C700, a medical workstation used to display data from connected Delta Family patient monitors. The flaw allows a local attacker to escape kiosk mode through a specific dialog interaction and access the underlying operating system. Once outside the kiosk, an attacker can manipulate the workstation to display incorrect patient data or suppress monitor output entirely. The issue is classified under [CWE-451] (User Interface Misrepresentation of Critical Information) and impacts patient safety in clinical environments where the C700 is relied upon for bedside monitoring.

Critical Impact

A local attacker with physical access to a C700 workstation can break out of the restricted kiosk shell, take control of the host OS, and cause the device to display false or missing patient vitals from connected Delta Family monitors.

Affected Products

• Dräger Infinity Explorer C700
• Dräger Infinity Delta Family patient monitors (downstream impact through connected C700)
• Affected version ranges are listed in the Dräger Security Advisory PDF

Discovery Timeline

• 2026-06-01 - CVE-2019-25718 published to NVD
• 2026-06-03 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2019-25718

Vulnerability Analysis

The Infinity Explorer C700 operates as a locked-down clinical workstation. It presents a restricted graphical kiosk that limits the operator to medical data review functions and prevents access to the underlying operating system. The vulnerability defeats that restriction. By interacting with a specific dialog exposed within the kiosk interface, an attacker triggers a code path that returns control to the host OS shell rather than keeping execution within the constrained application surface.

Once the attacker reaches the underlying OS, they inherit the privilege level of the kiosk process, which typically runs with elevated permissions to access medical telemetry and device drivers. The attacker can then alter the rendered patient data, terminate the monitoring application, or modify configuration files that govern how Delta Family monitor data is presented to clinicians.

Root Cause

The root cause is incomplete enforcement of the kiosk sandbox. A dialog component in the C700 application surface does not restrict the actions available to an unauthenticated local user, permitting escape to the host shell. This aligns with [CWE-451], where the user interface fails to faithfully constrain the security-critical context.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access to the C700 workstation. No authentication or user interaction beyond the attacker's own input is required. The attacker triggers the dialog interaction described in the VulnCheck Privilege Escalation Advisory, exits the kiosk, and operates the OS directly. The attack vector is constrained to physical or console-equivalent access, which is plausible in unattended clinical areas such as patient rooms, nurse stations, or operating theatres.

No verified exploit code is published for this CVE. Technical details are described in the linked vendor and third-party advisories.

Detection Methods for CVE-2019-25718

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected shell, file manager, or task manager windows appearing on a C700 workstation outside the standard kiosk interface
• C700 displays showing missing, frozen, or implausible vitals while the connected Delta Family monitor reports normal output
• Unauthorized configuration changes, new local accounts, or scheduled tasks on the C700 host OS
• Console login or session activity recorded at times that do not align with clinical engineering maintenance windows

Detection Strategies

• Audit C700 host operating system logs for process creations that are not part of the standard kiosk application stack
• Compare rendered C700 patient data against the source Delta Family monitor and the central nursing station to identify display divergence
• Monitor USB, keyboard, and input device connection events on C700 endpoints, as kiosk escapes often follow peripheral attachment
• Verify the integrity of kiosk configuration files and application binaries against a known-good baseline after every service event

Monitoring Recommendations

• Forward C700 host logs to a centralized SIEM or data lake and alert on shell process execution, configuration file writes, and account changes
• Deploy physical security controls (badge access, surveillance) for areas housing C700 workstations and correlate physical access events with host activity
• Establish periodic out-of-band verification of patient data displayed on C700 units against primary monitor readings during clinical rounds

How to Mitigate CVE-2019-25718

Immediate Actions Required

• Inventory all Dräger Infinity Explorer C700 units and identify firmware and software versions in scope of the vendor advisory
• Restrict physical access to C700 workstations to authorized clinical and biomedical staff only
• Apply the remediation guidance published by Dräger in the Draeger Security Advisory PDF in coordination with the device manufacturer
• Train clinical staff to cross-check C700 readings against the bedside Delta Family monitor when display anomalies are observed

Patch Information

Dräger documents affected versions and mitigation steps in the official security advisory for the Infinity Delta VF10.1 platform. Coordinate any firmware or software update with Dräger service representatives, since medical devices are subject to regulatory change-control processes. Refer to the Draeger Security Advisory PDF for the authoritative remediation procedure.

Workarounds

• Physically secure C700 workstations with lockable enclosures and disable unused input ports where clinically acceptable
• Place C700 units on isolated network segments and block outbound traffic except to required medical systems
• Disable or remove keyboards and pointing devices in deployment scenarios where operator input is not clinically required
• Increase rounding frequency or implement secondary monitoring displays in high-risk patient care areas until the vendor remediation is applied

# Configuration example - network isolation for medical workstations
# Replace interface and subnet values with those used in your clinical VLAN
iptables -A INPUT  -i eth0 -s 10.20.30.0/24 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT  -i eth0 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -d 10.20.30.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -j DROP